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INTRODUCTION
In March 1961, the Washington State Legislature (the
"Legislature") eliminated the judicial doctrine providing sovereign
immunity from tort liability for state government. Sovereign immunity is
the right of government to be free from suit or liability.' Sovereign
immunity originated in English law and both federal and state courts
consistently applied the doctrine after the United States became a nation.2
Courts perceived sovereign immunity to be a prudent protection for
government functions and taxpayer funds.3
The Legislature eliminated the sovereign immunity of state
government with a simple statutory "waiver" of the immunity, which
read as follows:
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1. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
2. See Richard Cosway, Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36 WASH.
L. REV. 312 (1961).
3. See Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 697, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1937).
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The State of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or
proprietary capacity, hereby consents to the maintaining of a suit or
action against it for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the
same extent as if it were a private person or corporation. The suit or
action shall be maintained in the county in which the cause of action
arises: Provided, That this section shall not affect any special statute
relating to procedure for filing notice of claims against the state or any
agency, department or officer of the state.
4
Attorney General John O'Connell described the Legislature's
action in sweeping terms in September 1961:
Within the body of public law, the doctrine of governmental
immunity from tort liability has been described as the towering thorn
from the tree which bears no fruit. Through the years, courts and
legislatures in this state and elsewhere have pruned the branches or
chopped off whole limbs; but it was not until this year that the
Washington State Legislature, in Chapter 136, Laws of 1961,
apparently laid the axe to the very roots of this doctrine.
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The Attorney General's description was accurate when first given
and remains accurate today. No other state had completely waived
sovereign immunity.6 Washington's waiver has not been modified.
Washington's waiver has been in force for nearly forty-five years,
during which time many questions have been answered. New litigation,
however, continues to expand the scope of the waiver, and the extent of
liability continues to raise new questions and present difficult problems.
Major problems include the uncertainty of case-by-case determinations
of government liability and the cost of liability for inherently risky
governmental 7 programs, such as corrections and child welfare.
Part I of this Article examines the waiver against the background of
prior Washington law and the pattern of immunity waivers in other
jurisdictions. This examination reveals surprising features of prior
Washington law, such as the narrow scope of liability for local
governments which lacked sovereign immunity before 1961. It also
4. 1961 Wash. Laws 136. The first sentence is the current WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090
(2002).
5. Attorney General, State of Washington, Tort Claims Against the State of Washington, panel
discussion presented to the Washington State Bar Association Annual Convention, (Sept. 1961) at I
[hereinafter Tort Claims].
6. New York had a waiver similar to the Washington waiver, but its administration and
interpretation by a specialized tribunal made it significantly different from the Washington waiver,
as explained infra Part C.
7. The term "governmental" indicates functions that are unique to government, such as the
exercise of power to regulate conduct or the creation of public welfare programs. This use of the
term is illustrated in Peter Herzog's article, infra note 47, discussing governmental liability under
New York's waiver.
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reveals fundamental differences between waivers in Washington and in
other states. Washington's waiver contains no partial immunities, no
limits on claims or damages, and no liability standards for government; it
requires neither legislative review and approval of claims, nor
adjudication of claims by special tribunals. Waivers in other states
contain at least one of these features; most contain two or more.
Part II of the Article summarizes three very different periods of
development of government liability law following the 1961 waiver. This
part of the Article includes summaries of state experience with claim and
defense costs, the effect of two tort reform acts (1981 and 1986), and
three proposals for legislative control of government tort liability.
Part II also summarizes the substance of Washington's
governmental liability law and compares it to the laws in other
jurisdictions. In the public duty doctrine, for example, Washington law is
similar to other jurisdictions. In other areas, including crimes committed
by released criminal offenders, Washington law is very different. These
differences have proved controversial because they have generated high
costs and affected administration of important programs. The law in
these areas remains unsettled.
Part III of this Article analyzes the results of Washington's waiver
and identifies problems caused by the waiver, arguing that court
interpretation of the waiver produced a result that was not intended by
legislators 45 years ago-expansive liability for purely governmental
functions and decisions. This liability has produced high legal defense
costs and increasing tort payouts for harms caused, not by the
government directly, but by third parties who have contact with broad
government programs. The Legislature should take action to ensure that
the waiver serves its original intent. The open-ended waiver should be
discarded in favor of a statutory scheme that defines the extent of
liability for various government functions, as such a scheme would better
serve the public interest.
I. THE WAIVER AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The 1961 Washington Waiver
The Washington Legislature's waiver of sovereign immunity
contained no hint of later controversies about the extent and cost of
government liability. House Bill (HB) 338, waiving the state's immunity,
was introduced on January 30, 1961, and reported out of the Judiciary
Committee with a do pass recommendation three days later.'
8. 1 House Journal, 37th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 184, 235 (Wash. 1961).
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The bill had wide support. Committee members voting in favor of
the bill included future Seattle Mayor Wes Uhlman, future state Attorney
General and United States Senator Slade Gorton, and future Washington
State Supreme Court Justice James Anderson. At its second reading on
February 7, HB 338 received its only amendment, a proviso stating that
the bill did not affect requirements for claim filing.9 On February 8, the
House passed HB 338 by a vote of 93-0.10 There was a similar lack of
controversy in the Senate. Although the waiver was rejected after it was
amended to have retroactive effect, it passed, without the amendment, on
March 6 by a vote of 32-9.11
Attorney General O'Connell portrayed the waiver as an advance in
social policy, writing the following:
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, although limited in scope
and strictly construed, represented the acceptance into the law of this
country of a valuable principle; and once accepted, that principle
expanded in scope, influence, and stature. Accordingly, with its
acceptance, there was no longer any reason to continue to give effect to
a doctrine universally condemned as productive of unnecessary
injustice. The practical experience of modem government with its
everyday contact with its citizens had shown that the state and its
agencies could injure an individual citizen in a number of ways. The
trend today is toward responsible government, that is, responsible
toward those for whose benefit and needs it presumably exists. It was in
recognition of sound principles of social policy for our state to abolish
the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity.12
Neither the Attorney General nor the four assistants who made the
1961 bar convention presentation predicted major problems as a result of
the waiver, though the assistants did note potential administrative
difficulties because the waiver contained no provisions for implementing
procedures or a method to fund claims.' 3 Only Assistant Attorney
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id. at 333.
11. 1 Senate Journal, 37th Leg. Reg. Sess., at 1010-11 (Wash. 1961). A supporter of the waiver
was Senator Fred Dore who, like Representative Anderson, served as a Justice on the State Supreme
Court during an era when the Court decided many of the important cases creating governmental
liability. Justice Dore was notable for his strong support for the public duty doctrine and his strong
dissent in the first case creating broad liability for state social welfare programs. See Babcock v.
State, 116 Wash. 2d 596, 643, 809 P.2d 143, 167-68 (1991) (Dore, J. dissenting). Interestingly,
Justice Anderson wrote a concurrence/dissent in the same case that expressed reservations on
liability for social welfare functions. Id. at 623, 809 P.2d at 157 (Anderson, J. concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The development of governmental liability law in these areas will be discussed in
the second section of this article.
12. Tort Claims, supra note 5, at 9.
13. Id. at 38-48.
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General Delbert Johnson forecasted that the generality of the waiver
would cause difficulty.
Certainly, the areas of state immunity are not now clearly defined.
The Washington statute gives little guidance. It would seem obvious
that a substantial amount of litigation will be required before anyone
can make any reasonable conclusions on extent of the area of exclusion
from liability in the new act.
14
Forty-five years after the waiver, as subsequent sections of this Article
discuss, there is still ongoing litigation over the extent of tort liability for
governmental functions in Washington.
In 1963, the Legislature provided procedures for claims, lawsuits,
and funding. 5 In that same year, Kelso v. City of Tacoma held that the
state waiver included municipal corporations.' 6 The Legislature enacted a
separate waiver, essentially identical to the state waiver, for local
government in 1967.17 In response to concerns about increasing claims
and costs, the 1989 Legislature added risk management provisions and
changed claim and funding provisions. 18 The 1999 Legislature moved
legal defense costs "off-budget" by providing that they could be funded
directly out of the non-appropriated liability account.' 9 There were no
changes to the waiver itself in any of the later legislation.
B. Washington Government Liability Before the Waiver
Although the state had complete immunity prior to 1961, 20 cities,
counties, and quasi-municipal corporations had liability for torts. Cities
had liability for proprietary functions, which included common city
services such as water, electricity, sewer, garbage, and maintenance of
streets and sidewalks. 2' The primary areas of municipal immunity were
14. Id. at 28.
15. 1963 Wash. Laws 159. The statutes contained no law governing liability and deleted the
claim proviso.
16. 63 Wash. 2d 913, 916-17, 360 P.2d 2, 5 (1963).
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1967).
18. 1989 Wash. Laws 419.
19. 1999 Wash. Laws 163.
20. While the state had immunity, officials were sometimes sued in tort. In Emery v. Littlejohn,
83 Wash. 334, 145 P. 423 (1915), the plaintiff sued, accusing the state official of negligence for the
release of a mental patient who shot the plaintiff. The court held that the claim should be dismissed
because the release decisions were discretionary and quasi-judicial. The Legislature also paid
"sundry" claims. See Laws of 1959, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 11, which contains appropriations for a person
shot during a prison riot and for various highway and game claims.
21. Survey of 1953 Washington Case Law, Municipal Corporations, Tort Liability, 29 WASH.
L. REV. 137 (1954). Proprietary functions were generally activities analogous to those of private
business.
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governmental functions, such as police, parks, and health. 22 Counties and
quasi-municipal governments, such as school districts, had no immunity.
The Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 4.08.120,23 enacted when
Washington was still a territory but still in effect today, provides in part
that "an action may be maintained against a county or other of public
corporations mentioned or described in RCW 4.08.110... for an injury
to the rights of plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such county
or other public corporation."
The lack of immunity for local governments did not produce broad
liability. Suits against local governments were for routine torts caused
directly by acts or omissions of public employees, such as failures to
repair roads and sidewalks,24 or injuries to children caused by property
defects or actions of school employees. The few cases that imposed
broader liability stand out as deviations.26
The limited local government liability before 1961 was consistent
with common law doctrines at that time. In his recent article, Un-making
Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, Professor Feinman
points out that "classical" tort law had stable concepts of fault, causation,
and damages which kept tort liabilities within well-defined parameters,
and observes that tort law changed dramatically in a 20-year period
beginning in the mid-1960s.27 Courts adopted a "neoclassical" approach
to tort law, which was influenced by enterprise liability and risk
spreading.28 Under neoclassical law, courts applied rules governing
negligence and damages less rigorously, using tort law to make social
policy, resulting in rapid liability expansion and large cost increases.
22. Tort claims were sometimes allowed even for these agencies. Hosea v. City of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967 (1964), held that a city could be liable for an automobile accident
caused by a jail inmate when he was charged with washing police cars, an act which the court
considered proprietary.
23. 1869 Wash. Laws 166 at § 600.
24. Boggess v. King County, 150 Wash. 578, 274 P. 188 (1929) (highway repair).
25. Morris v. Union High Sch., 160 Wash. 121, 294 P. 998 (1931) (injury caused by coach);
Stovall v. City ofToppenish Sch. Dist., 110 Wash. 97, 188 P. 12 (1920) (hazardous object).
26. Berglund v. County of Spokane, 4 Wash. 2d 309, 103 P.2d 333 (1940), held that the county
could be liable to an injured pedestrian not for lack of repair on an old bridge, but for failure to fund
capital improvements (adding sidewalks). McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255
P.2d 360 (1953), held that a school district could be liable for the rape of a student based largely on a
theory that the school was negligent for having an empty unlocked room which could be a site for a
crime. A survey of 1953 case law approved McLeod's determination that the school district had no
immunity, but stated that the 5-4 decision on the issues of duty, causation, and foreseeability "may
be open to criticism on the basis of tort principles" and "[t]hat a school district may be held liable for
rape of a student is admittedly startling." Survey of 1963 Washington Case Law, Municipal
Corporations, Tort Liability, 29 WASH. L. REV. 137, 138-39 (1954).
27. Jay Feinman, Un-making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATrLE U.
L. REV. 1, 29-33 (2004).
28. Id.
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When the Legislature waived immunity, the perceived problem was
that citizens could not recover for ordinary torts if they were committed
by agencies performing governmental functions. For instance, Hagerman
v. City of Seattle held that the city was immune from liability for a
vehicle accident because the driver worked for the health department, a
governmental agency.29 The strong dissent did not object to immunity for
"fire apparatuses, police cars, and ambulances responding to emergency
call," but rather objected to liability being determined by "the character
of the department to which the vehicle is assigned for services, rather
than to the character of use to which the vehicle is put.
30
The Legislature waived immunity in a context in which courts
disliked immunity because it prevented recoveries for commonplace
torts-such as auto accidents-from agencies performing governmental
functions. The context of the waiver indicates that it was intended to
allow liability for commonplace torts rather than for governmental
functions. The upcoming development of "neoclassical" tort theories
and changing judicial views would give the waiver consequences far
beyond those contemplated at the time of the waiver.
C. Waivers of lmmunity in Other States
Although the Washington Supreme Court long urged the
Legislature to waive immunity, no single case served as an immediate
impetus for the waiver. However, judicial waivers in three other states
might have influenced the Legislature. In 1957, the Florida Supreme
Court refused to apply sovereign immunity to a claim arising from a fire
at a jail. 31 In 1959, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to apply sovereign
immunity to a claim for a school bus accident.32 In January 1961, the
California Supreme Court completely abrogated sovereign immunity in a
case involving an injury at a public hospital.33 All three cases involved
common torts committed by agencies with governmental functions. Just
like the cases that caused the Washington Supreme Court to suggest a
waiver of immunity, the torts did not involve issues of governmental
29. 189 Wash. 694, 703-04, 66 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1937).
30. Id. at 706, 66 P.2d at 1157. Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 261 P.2d 407
(1953), a case in which the supreme court reiterated that it would leave to the Legislature the
question of waiver of immunity, is similar. Kilbourn held that the city had immunity because the
plaintiffchild was injured by a tree limb in a city park. If the child had been injured on a sidewalk or
on school or county property, there would have been no immunity.
31. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), superseded in statute;
Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1981).
32. Molitor v. Kaneland Comm'ty Unif. Dist. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (III. 1959) (noting that, in
Washington, a school district would not have been immune).
33. Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
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action, policy, or decision-making. The focus of the cases was on
liability for injuries that would be compensable under then existing tort
theories but for the fact that the agency causing the injury performed
governmental functions.
Even if Washington's waiver was inspired by waivers in Florida,
Illinois, and California, its breadth was unlike subsequent legislation in
those states. Florida and Illinois quickly re-imposed immunity: Florida
waived immunity in 1973, but imposed a $100,000 per person limit,
34
and Illinois eventually waived immunity, but controlled liability through
a special claims court and various limits. 35 California was reportedly
deluged with lawsuits, 36 prompting its Legislature to impose a
moratorium on claims, followed shortly by a re-imposition of immunity
with detailed exceptions.37
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, all but a few states waived
immunity for state and local government. 38 A majority of states imposed
limits on damages, which now range from a low of $50,000 per person
and per incident in Nevada to a high of $1 million per person and $5
million per incident in Nebraska. 39 A majority of states have also either
preserved immunities for a range of government functions or have
preserved immunity generally and have enumerated functions for which
liability could be imposed, sometimes with standards governing the
liability.40 Common areas in which tort claim acts did not allow liability
were regulatory and licensing activities, 4' discretionary decisions on
governmental matters,42 release and supervision of offenders or mental
34. FLA. STAT. ch. 768.28 (1973).
35. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1, 505/8 (1972). The damage limit is $100,000 except for vehicle
claims.
36. Colorado Legislative Council Research, Governmental Liability in Colorado, Report to the
Colorado General Assembly, Pub. No. 134 at 112 (1968).
37. 1961 Cal. Stat. 1404; 1963 Cal. Stat. 1681, et seq. See generally CALIFORNIA BAR ASS'N,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE (3d ed. 1992).
38. Keeton, supra note 1.
39. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-926 (2003). The Nebraska limits
are for local governments whose claims are adjudicated by courts of general jurisdiction without a
jury. The State of Nebraska has no damage limit, but tort claims are adjudicated by a special
administrative tribunal. Nebraska has extensive exemptions from liability for such things as
inspections, licenses, highway design and improvements, exercise of employee discretion, and snow
or ice conditions on roads. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-910, 81-8, 219 (2003).
40. NAT'L ASSOC. OF ATT'YS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LIABILITY OF
GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS (Nov. 1976). Appendix I to this article is a chart comparing the
waivers of immunity and damage limitations adopted in 49 other states.
41. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6 (2005).
42. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820 (West 2005).
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patients,43 and design of or lack of capital improvements to public roads
or facilities."
New York was the only state to waive immunity before
Washington, enacting an open-ended waiver in 1929. New York's
waiver differed from Washington's in two respects. First, it provided that
liability would be "determined in accordance with the same rules of law
as applied to actions in the supreme court [trial court in New York]
against individuals or corporations," but did not expressly waive liability
for "governmental" functions. 45 Second, it assigned adjudication of
claims to the Court of Claims, a court that handled contract claims, with
no provision for jury trials.46 New York developed law that allowed
liability for ordinary torts committed by agencies with governmental
functions, but rejected liability for governmental acts.47 For instance,
New York would be liable for injuries to prisoners caused by prison
conditions, but not for confining, releasing, or supervising offenders who
caused injury to others.4 8
Some states performed detailed studies of proposed tort claim acts.
Two studies in the 1960s examined the open-ended 49 approach adopted
by Washington, and both rejected it. Kentucky concluded that the open-
ended approach would cause problems with the scope of liability,
uncertainty of risk, cost, and ability to obtain insurance. Kentucky's
findings are as follows:
"Open-end" legislation usually carries wide open liability. This
causes difficulty in operation; because of the wide area of unforeseen
injuries and unlimited damages, the agency or governmental entity
would have no basis upon which to foresee and pay claims. Insurance
has proven difficult to obtain because of the expanse of the potential
risk and indefinite scope of liability; of course, insuring against
unlimited contingencies would be prohibitive.
50
Three years later, Colorado reached similar conclusions about open-
ended waivers:
43. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-820.02(A) (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856(a)(3) (West 1995).
44. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-904(7) (1971).
45. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (1939).
46. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 12(3) (1939).
47. See Peter Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for Purely Governmental Functions,
10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 30 (1958).
48. See Tarter v. New York, 503 N.E.2d 84 (N.Y. 1986); Williams v. New York, 127 N.E.2d
545 (N.Y. 1955); Scamato v. New York, 83 N.E.2d 841 (N.Y. 1949).
49. Some articles call the Washington approach a "blanket waiver" and consider an open-
ended approach to be one in which immunity is completely waived except for defined areas.
50. Michael Canover, Governmental Immunity, KY. LEGIS. RESEARCH COMM'N 22-23, 63
(Nov. 30, 1965).
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The main criticism of this type of approach is that the nature of
governmental and public activities and functions is not comparable to
private activities and responsibilities. Public agencies necessarily
engage in a broad spectrum of activities having no private counterpart,
which often involve relatively high degrees of exposure to injury-
producing events, and which the government cannot voluntarily
terminate since they are performed as a matter of public duty. Private
persons and corporations, on the other hand, are ordinarily free to
withdraw from activities which entail undue risks of liability.
These differences suggest that it might not be wise to treat public
and private entities alike for tort liability purposes.51
The conclusions reached by these legislative studies almost 40
years ago were insightful, predicting issues that would arise from
Washington's open-ended waiver of immunity.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT
LIABILITY LAW AFTER THE WAIVER
Legal developments after the waiver can be divided into three
periods in which government liability law went from a period of stability
to a period of rapid expansion to a period of retrenchment and debate
over the boundaries of liability for risk-prone programs.
A. Washington Government Liability Law: 1961-1973
1. Case Law Development
For the first dozen years after the waiver, Washington law showed
no sign of liability expansion and remained similar to law before 1961.
The first significant case, Evangelical Church of Adna v. State,
52
raised the issue of whether the 1961 waiver actually abrogated immunity
for truly governmental functions. In Evangelical, plaintiffs successfully
sued the State for fire damage caused by a juvenile who had escaped
from an "open program" at a correctional facility. Plaintiffs contended
51. Colorado Legislative Council Research, supra note 36, at 118. Colorado rejected an open-
ended waiver after noting: "Under this process, the extent of governmental liability cannot be
determined with certainty. Many cases must be tried and processed through the courts, many of
which may result in the government defendant not being held liable. The financial stability of many
public entities may also be left unprotected because of the unavailability of insurance at rates that
they can afford to pay, resulting from the unknown potential liability." Colorado Legislative Council
Research, supra note 36, at 13 1.
52. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
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that the State was negligent for having an open program and for
assigning the juvenile to the program. 3 The State sought reversal
because the state acts involved judgment and discretion. 54 Evangelical
concluded that the waiver's requirement that liability be analogous to
private liability meant that "the statute does not render the state liable for
every harm that may flow from governmental action, or constitute the
state a surety for every governmental enterprise involving an element of
risk.",55 The court reversed the verdict, stating that there must be room for
government policy decisions and their implementation without the threat
of tort liability.
56
Evangelical was a seminal case because it interpreted the private
liability limitation in the waiver as excluding governmental functions
from liability. Evangelical was significant because it immunized not only
policymaking, but also the operational steps taken by officials to
implement policy. The court's interpretation of the waiver was consistent
with both New York's interpretation of the private liability limitation in
its waiver and the federal courts' interpretation of the discretionary
immunity limitation in the federal waiver.
57
Although Evangelical followed existing law, the case had an
internal inconsistency. The court held that discretionary immunity did
not protect the State from liability for the assignment of the juvenile
offender to a "boiler room detail" that was not affiliated with the open
program.58 In so doing, the court protected the State from liability for its
implementation of the decision to have an open program-an
administrative decision-but allowed liability for the risks inherent in the
decision to have the underlying low security rehabilitation program-a
legislative decision. This part of Evangelical forecast the approach taken
in cases during the later period of expanding liability. The later cases
would not apply the private liability limitation in the waiver and would
53. Id. at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 253, 407 P.2d at 444.
56. Id. at 254, 407 P.2d at 444.
57. A law review analysis criticized Evangelical's protection of policy implementation (the
assignment to the open program). See Discretionary Acts Protected by Governmental Immunity,
Survey of Washington Laws, 41 WASH. L. REV. 552 (1966) [hereinafter Discretionary Acts].
However, Evangelical relied on the leading federal case, Dalelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953), which protected policy implementation. Later federal cases have continued that practice. See
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991). Some courts interpreted Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), as allowing liability for "operational" acts done to implement policy, but
Gaubert and other decisions in the past 25 years have held that discretionary immunity protects
judgments made by lower-level employees who are implementing policies that require making
decisions concerning the application of policies and rules to facts. See Timothy B. Richards, Tenth
Circuit Survey, Torts Survey: Governmental Liability, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 821 (1995).
58. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 455.
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not use discretionary immunity to protect operational acts done to
implement policies in risk-prone governmental programs.59
In the years immediately after the waiver, only one other case
discussed liability for truly governmental acts. Creelman v. Svenning
60
involved a claim that a prosecutor, a county, and the State should be
liable for malicious prosecution and negligence in filing charges that
were later dismissed. The supreme court affirmed a dismissal based on
pre-waiver case law holding that prosecuting attorneys have absolute
immunity.6 1 Creelman did not mention Evangelical, probably because
counties have never had sovereign immunity. Older cases had protected
the governmental prosecution function despite the statute providing for
tort actions against counties. Creelman is consistent with Evangelical
because it immunized, not only the decision to file charges, but also the
ministerial details done to prepare for filing.62 Further, Creelman rejected
an argument that the 1961 waiver meant that the prosecutor could have
immunity, but the county and the State would be liable for the
prosecutor's acts.6 3 The court held that government liability would affect
decisions of the prosecutor, rendering the prosecutor's immunity
ineffective.64
In the period after the waiver, all cases claiming liability for
government highway functions concerned maintenance and signage
issues.65 Not one case raised questions about design or failure to make
capital improvements, which could involve governmental issues such as
funding, priority, or design choice. The supreme court decided one case
that concerned maintenance issues, but had larger implications on the
scope of governmental tort duties. That case, Morgan v. State,66 involved
59. The import of Evangelical's discussion of the third claim was probably not appreciated at
that time because the claim was dismissed based on lack of foreseeability. Barnum v. State, 72
Wash. 2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967), also foreshadowed later cases by implying that immunity did
not protect acts implementing policy decisions but, because it was only a reversal of a CR 12(b)(6)
motion and a remand, it had very little effect.
60.67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966).
61. Id at 884, 410 P.2d at 607-08.
62. The complaint alleged not only liability for the decision to prosecute, but negligence in
reviewing the information in the file and in failing to conduct an investigation before filing. Id. at
884, 410 P.2d 607.
63. Id. at 885, 410 P.2d at 608.
64. This rejected a theory of "state liability despite employee immunity" that had been
advanced in the law review survey discussing Evangelical. See Discretionary Acts, supra note 57, at
552, 558.
65. Bartlett v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 74 Wash. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 735 (1968); Provins v. Bevis, 70
Wash. 2d 131, 422 P.2d 505 (1967); Raybell v. State, 6 Wash. App. 795, 496 P.2d 559 (1972).
Meabon v. State, I Wash. App. 824, 463 P.2d 789 (1970), actually narrowed prior liability by
holding that the duty to maintain and repair could be satisfied by posting signs warning of hazardous
conditions.
66. 71 Wash. 2d 826, 430 P.2d 947 (1967).
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a child who was killed after he wandered onto a freeway through a
broken fence. In affirming dismissal based on lack of duty, the court
relied on the absence of a statute creating a duty to fence roads and on an
examination of accepted highway engineering standards.6 7 The court
used highway standards to determine that the purpose of highway
fencing was to reduce obstructions for motorists, not to protect
children.68 The importance of Morgan lies in the court's examination of
the details of the particular program in order to determine the scope of an
agency's tort duty. The court's willingness to limit duty in the absence of
statutes or standards mandating actions would become less evident in
later cases.
The first regulatory liability cases were Nerbun v. State69 and Loger
v. Washington Timber Prods., Inc.70 In those cases, the court of appeals
held that the purpose of industrial safety inspection laws was to improve
workplace safety, but workplace safety laws did not create a duty to
protect individual workers. 71 These cases were consistent with Morgan
because they looked at statutes and standards to determine tort duty, and
then looked to the breadth of that duty to determine if liability should be
imposed.
In summary, Washington courts took a cautious approach to the
waiver of immunity before 1974. There were no changes to already
existing tort liabilities of government agencies.72
2. Claim and Legal Defense Costs
The total cost of payments on tort lawsuits and claims through June
30, 1974, was miniscule. In the 1963-1965 biennium, the state paid 44
judgments and lawsuits, with a total payout of $241,000. 73 In the next
five biennia, total tort claim payments were:
67. Id. at 830, 430 P.2d at 949-50.
68. Id. at 828, 430 P.2d at 948.
69. 8 Wash. App. 370, 506 P.2d 873 (1973).
70. 8 Wash. App. 921, 509 P.2d 1009 (1973). Loger also determined that inspections were
protected by discretionary immunity, finding that discretion was intrinsic to the inspections. Later
cases rejected liability because inspections are related to workers' compensation and protected by
workers' compensation immunity. See Nielson v. Wolfkill Corp., 47 Wash. App. 352, 734 P.2d 961,
review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1008 (1987).
71. Nerbun, 8 Wash. App. at 376, 506 P.2d at 877 (1973); Loger, 8 Wash. App. at 931, 509
P.2d at 1015.
72. In Fosbre v. State, 76 Wash. 2d 255, 456 P.2d 335 (1969), the supreme court even held that
the waiver of immunity did not include interest on judgments.
73. The state budgets on a biennial basis and the budget year runs from July 1 to June 30. The
1963-1965 biennium is the period from July 1, 1962, to June 30, 1964. The state has accurate tort
claim cost records because 1963 Wash. Laws 159 at §§ 7 and 10 created a separate tort claims
account and directed that all tort payments be made from this account. The payment records
presented here are from compilations made in the 1970s by the chief of the Attorney General's
14 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 29:1






Tort payments remained stable for eight years at under $1 million
per biennium.
7 4
In this period of traditional liabilities, more than 60 percent of claim
payments were for highway maintenance liability claims. The only other
agency with significant payments was the Department of Institutions,
which included prisons and later became part of the Department of
Social and Health Services (DSHS). The claims for this agency related to
patient and inmate care and premises liability, but in three of the biennia,
even this agency had no significant payments. 5
Claim adjustment and legal defense costs were also miniscule in
this period. There was no identifiable claim adjustment cost because this
function was delegated to each agency for routine claims. 76 The Attorney
General's Office had no separate tort defense division until 1969, and, at
that time, it consisted of only five attorneys, three legal secretaries, and
77one investigator, with a budget less than $200,000 per year.
Office, Torts Division, from state budget agency data available at that time. State tort costs were
paid from a general tort account, but the account was funded by reimbursements from the operating
budgets of agencies that generated tort claims. 1963 Wash. Laws 159 at § 11.
74. These amounts do not include claims which were covered by insurance, but the state
carried virtually no insurance. See BETrERLY CONSULTING GROUP, RISK MANAGEMENT STUDY FOR
STATE OF WASHINGTON (1976). The state carried limited insurance for vehicle accidents and for
some colleges and universities, but the 1976 consultant report advised that most insurance be
cancelled as not cost-effective.
75. In 1963-65, institutions had no payments; in 1969-71 and 1971-73, they had only $24,000
and $31,000, respectively.
76. 1963 Wash. Laws 159 at § 8.
77. Cost figures for earlier years can be adjusted to later years by using the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) Deflator. Using the GDP Deflator, $1.00 in 1974 was worth $3.04 in 2003. Thus, the
approximately $1 million in tort payouts in the 1973-1975 biennium would be approximately $3
million in 2003 dollars. Similar GDP Deflator figures for other years, for use in adjusting later
figures are: $2.13 in 1979; $1.56 in 1984; $1.34 in 1989; $1.17 in 1994; and $1.08 in 1999. See
Samuel H. Williamson, What is the Relative Value? ECONOMIC HISTORY SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2004),
available at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare. Appendix 11 presents state tort claim costs from 1961
to present in a bar graph.
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B. Washington Government Liability Law: 1974-1998
1. Case Law Development
The twenty-five years after 1973 produced unprecedented new
liability for governmental functions. The courts created liabilities that
were well beyond those imposed on the state and cities in the first dozen
years after the waiver. The liabilities were also unlike any that had been
imposed on counties and quasi-municipal governments in their 100 years
without sovereign immunity. During this period, courts took a
fundamentally different approach to public liability.
a. Discretionary Immunity
In 1974, King v. City of Seattle7' removed the foundation
supporting liability protections for governmental functions. Relying on a
California case 7 9 rather than on Evangelical, the King court held that
there was no immunity for discretionary activities unless the government
could show that a "policy decision, consciously balancing risk and
advantages, took place." 80 The court also stated that there could be no
immunity for decisions which were not "considered," would have been
adopted by "no reasonable official," or were arbitrary and capricious.
8 1
The focus on the wisdom of the decision was different from prior law,
which had held that the correctness of the decision was immaterial.
Earlier cases stated that the purpose of the immunity was to protect the
ability of legislative and executive branches to implement policy, which
could not be accomplished if the immunity depended on the courts' view
of a decision's wisdom or motivation.
82
After King, the courts imposed further restrictions on discretionary
immunity. Later cases stated that discretionary decisions must be made at
a "truly executive level" rather than an operational level83 and that
immunity could apply only to executive level policymaking decisions
rather than "field" decisions. 84 The effect of the new interpretation of
discretionary immunity was to limit immunity to adoption of laws,
regulations, and policies by legislative bodies, and elected or appointed
78. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
79. Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968).
80. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 232-3 (1974).
81. Id. at 247, 525 P.2d at 233.
82. See, e.g., Evangelical Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 254, 407 P.2d 440, 444
(1965).
83. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975).
84. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984).
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officials.8 5 Unlike Evangelical and several relevant federal cases,8 6 these
new cases did not provide immunity when officials made decisions
needed to implement policies. 7 Among the functions for which the court
found had no immunity were: (1) the issuance or denial of permits;8 8 (2)
the initiation of police vehicle chases;89 (3) the release of mental
patients;9° (4) the conduct of police investigations or response to
emergency calls;91 (5) the supervision of paroled felons; 92 (6) the design
of highways;93 and (7) military activities.
94
By allowing liability for implementation of policies, King created
liability that had not existed previously in Washington or in other
jurisdictions. Other states adopted immunities, damage caps, special
procedures for government claims or, like New York, judicially limited
liability for governmental functions. Moreover, while King relied on a
California decision to limit discretionary immunity, California continued
to apply discretionary immunity, along with various statutory limitations,
to decisions made by lower-level officials. 95
85. The only significant governmental functions protected by discretionary immunity since
King have been the Governor's issuance of an executive order on the Mount St. Helens volcano
(Cougar Bus. Owners Ass'n v. State, 97 Wash. 2d 466, 647 P.2d 481 (1982); Karr v. State, 53 Wash.
App. I, 765 P.2d 316 (1988)), an agency director's decision to issue regulations (Bergh v. State, 21
Wash. App. 393, 585 P.2d 805 (1978)), and the Parole Board's decision to parole (Noonan v. State,
53 Wash. App. 558, 769 P.2d 313 (1989)).
86. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991); Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955); Dalelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
87. The only later case that followed Evangelical in protecting policy implementation was
Jenson v. Scribner, 57 Wash. App. 478, 789 P.2d 306 (1990). The court held that discretionary
immunity applied to the Department of Transportation's implementation of the legislature's decision
to fund installation of a median barrier.
88. Miotke, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 678 P.2d 803; Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 547
P.2d 1221 (1976); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 232-3 (1974).
89. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 325, 534 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1975).
90. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
91. Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 582, 664 P.2d 492 (1983); Chambers-Castanes v.
King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).
92. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992).
93. Stewart v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 285, 597 P.2d 101 (1979).
94. Emsley v. Army Nat'l Guard, 106 Wash. 2d 474, 722 P.2d 1299 (1986) involved an injury
during training. Emsley not only rejected immunity, it did not mention the private liability condition,
which the court had found determinative in an earlier military case. See Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d
217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979), discussed infra note 97.
95. California cases protected difficult decisions that depended on evaluation of complex
circumstances, such as decisions concerning abuse complaints and child placements. See Thompson
v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (selection of custodians for minor state wards);
Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1990) (investigation of child
abuse); Bratt v. City & County of San Francisco, 123 Cal. Rptr. 774 (Ct. App. 1975) (police
functions such as initiation of pursuits); O'Hagan v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 113 Cal. Rptr. 501
(Ct. App. 1974) (permit and license issuance); Bums v. City of Folsom, 107 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Ct. App.
1973) (permit and license issuance). None of these activities are immune in Washington.
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b. Duty and Proximate Cause
With the loss of most discretionary immunity, the state began
receiving claims for negligence in performing basic governmental
functions, such as driver licensing. In LaPlante v. State,96 for example,
the plaintiff claimed that the waiver of immunity made the State liable
for injuries suffered in an accident caused by a taxi driver who was
negligently licensed. The court rejected the argument that the waiver
itself created tort duties, holding instead that a claimant must establish
that the State had a duty under existing tort law and that the breach of the
duty was a cause of the injury.97
The major issue in cases after LaPlante became whether
government agencies had a duty to prevent the harm alleged by a
claimant. In Brown v. MacPherson 's,98 the court expanded the concept of
government liability, holding that agencies could have liability for failure
to perform duties lying outside the statutory authority of the agencies. 99
This holding was a major change from the traditional rule that an agency
has no authority to act except pursuant to powers expressly granted by
statute or necessarily implied therefrom. 0 0
After the Washington Supreme Court broadened the tort duties of
government agencies, the court used proximate causation to limit some
of those duties as a matter of "policy." In King v. City of Seattle, the
court held that city permit errors should not lead to liability when the
plaintiff had not taken actions that would have allowed a project to
proceed despite city errors.'0 ' In Hartley v. State,10 2 a case cited
frequently in later decisions, the court held that the failure to revoke a
driver's license was "too remote or insubstantial to impose liability"
' 0 3
96. 85 Wash. 2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 (1975).
97. The claim in LaPlante was ultimately dismissed on the basis of lack of causation and the
court never reached the duty issue. Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979), involving
a claim by a state National Guard officer for alleged retaliatory conduct by a superior officer,
reiterated that the waiver did not create any causes of action and that a plaintiff must show that a
cause of action would exist in a private context before he or she can proceed with a claim against the
state. The court held that the plaintiff in Edgar had no basis for his action because private employees
have no right to sue supervisors for harsh supervision or abuse of discretion.
98.86 Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975).
99. Plaintiffs contended that the state real estate broker licensing division had failed to convey
a warning of an impending avalanche above a recreational subdivision. The licensing division
(which asserted that it had relayed the information to the property broker) had no regulatory
authority over the subdivision. The court held that the state could be liable for the implied promise of
its employee.
100. See, e.g., Barendregt v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. 140, 26 Wash. App. 246, 611 P.2d 1385,
review denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1005 (1980).
101. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 252, 525 P.2d 228, 236 (1974).
102. 103 Wash. 2d 768, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).
103. Id. at 784, 698 P.2d at 84.
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for a drunk driving accident. The court stated that it might be immaterial
whether it analyzed liability based on duty or proximate cause. 0 4 The
court also noted that licensing was not intended to protect particular
persons, presumably meaning that there was no duty to plaintiffs.' °5
Hartley's circuitous discussion of duty and legal causation indicates
some uncertainty concerning the boundaries of regulatory liability which,
until later decisions firmly established the public duty doctrine, was left
largely unresolved.
c. Regulatory Liability
The narrow interpretation given to discretionary immunity in both
King v. City of Seattle and Mason v. Bitton raised questions about
liability for regulatory activities. Georges v. Tudor,10 6 the first case after
King to reject liability for regulation, provided the beginning of an
answer. Georges was a lawsuit claiming city liability for a building
collapse because the city had not enforced the building code. The court
held that regulatory statutes create a duty to act for the public welfare,
but do not create duties to protect individuals. 0 7 Three years later in
Baerlein v. State,108 the Supreme Court built on Georges, applying the
same concept of duty and holding that the Legislature had not intended
securities regulation to create a duty to protect individual investors. 109
The limitation of duty for regulatory functions was first called the
"public duty doctrine" in J&B Devel. v. King County.110 It applied to
licensing, permits, inspections, and police functions,"' as well as to
correctional and social programs that were intended to improve public
welfare (such as by lowering the crime rate), but was not, however,
intended to solve a public problem in every situation."1
2
104. Id. at 780, 698 P.2d at 84.
105. Id. at 785, 698 P.2d at 86.
106. 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (1976).
107. Id. at 410, 556 P.2d at 567.
108. 92 Wash. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979).
109. Baerlein, like many regulatory cases, supported its conclusions with statements of
legislative intent, the breadth of the regulatory scheme, and the limited amount of enforcement
resources. Id.
110. 100 Wash. 2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983).
111. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).
112. Forest v. State, 62 Wash. App. 363, 814 P.2d 1181 (1991), held that the parole system
was intended to reduce crime generally, but not to prevent specific crimes. A later case, Taggart v.
State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992), held that parole supervision did create a duty to
prevent crime, but used a different analysis. Yonker v. State, 85 Wash. App. 71, 930 P.2d 958 (1997),
analyzed the investigative functions of child protective investigators and found that the public duty
doctrine applied, but also held that an exception applied, permitting liability for investigation of
child abuse.
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Some court opinions stated that the public duty doctrine was
inconsistent with the waiver, 1 3 suggesting that the duty of a government
agency should be analyzed without reference to its public status and
using only analogies to private liabilities. However, the analogies were
poor. For instance, the opinions suggested that the duty for building code
inspections should be the same duty as for private fire, boiler, or elevator
inspections.' 14 None of the opinions adequately acknowledged the
difference between government inspections and private inspections, and
none were able to convey the nuanced difference between government
"spot checks," not intended to identify all violations, and independently
contracted private inspections, intended to identify all." 15 The argument
that the public duty doctrine was inconsistent with the waiver was
eventually rejected under the rationale that the court must decide the
appropriate scope of duty for government defendants, just as it does for
private defendants." 
6
The public duty doctrine did not abolish all liability for regulation
because the Washington Supreme Court found that the statutes for some
programs or the actions of employees could create a duty to an
individual. The court, through these cases, developed three exceptions to
the public duty doctrine.117
The legislative intent exception created a duty if statutes showed "a
clear intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of
persons."" 18 Only three cases found that this exception applied. The first
involved a code for dilapidated hotels, 1 9 another involved police action
required in domestic violence cases, 20 and the final case involved
investigation of child abuse complaints. 121 This final case is the most
113. J&B Devel., 100 Wash. 2d at 310-11, 669 P.2d at 475-6; Bailey v. Town of Forks, 108
Wash. 2d 262, 727 P.2d 1257 (1987).
114. See, e.g., J&B Devel., 100 Wash. 2d at 310, 669 P.2d at 475.
115. A law review comment argued that liability for regulatory programs depends on whether
programs should have a duty based on foreseeability of injury and ability to prevent injury. Jennifer
K. Marcus, Comment, Washington's Special Relationship Exception to the Public Duty Doctrine, 64
WASH. L. REV. 401 (1989). This approach would result in liability for essentially all injuries within
the regulated sphere of activity without recognition that regulatory programs typically audit only a
percentage of regulated activity. Moreover, foreseeability is a legal concept which is not the basis for
duty, but is a limitation on the scope of an acknowledged duty. See, e.g., Halleran v. NuWest, Inc.,
123 Wash. App. 701,98 P.3d 52 (2004).
116. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash, 2d 275, 287, 669 P.2d 451 (1983);
Gamett v. City of Bellevue, 59 Wash. App. 281, 796 P.2d 782 (1990).
117. Some cases list the "rescue doctrine," discussed in Brown v. MacPherson 's, Inc., 86
Wash. 2d 293, 545 P.2d 13 (1975), as a fourth exception, but that was not a regulatory duty case,
since the state had no regulatory authority over the matter at issue.
118. Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978).
119. Id.
120. Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 65 Wash. App. 661, 831 P.2d 1098 (1992).
121. Yonker v. State, 85 Wash. App. 71, 930 P.2d 958 (1997).
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important of the three, as it created a significant liability. Yonker
identified abused children as a particular and circumscribed class
intended to receive the benefit of child protective laws, rather than
identifying all children to be beneficiaries of those laws. 2  Yonker
narrowed the class benefited by a regulatory statute to the subset of
persons injured if the statute is not enforced.123 This approach might
bring all regulatory schemes within the exception. Every regulatory
scheme that benefits a broad class, such as licensing of medical
professionals, can be said to benefit only a circumscribed class if the
class is limited to those injured if the scheme is not enforced, such as
victims of medical errors.
The special relationship exception 24 created liability if a plaintiff
had direct contact with a regulatory official who gave express assurances
on which the plaintiff relied to his or her detriment. 125 In J&B Devel. v.
King County, the court held that building department approval of plans
was an assurance that the plans met the code. 12 6 This made government
liable for contractor errors in plans.127 The liability ended when Taylor v.
Stevens County overruled J&B Devel., holding that plan approval was
not an express assurance. The courts have rarely applied the special
relationship exception since Taylor.
28
The "failure to enforce" exception created liability if officials had
actual knowledge of a statutory violation and failed to take corrective
action, despite a mandatory duty to do so.' 29 Bailey v. Town of Forks
30
was the first case to recognize this exception by name, but the exception
had been applied earlier in Campbell v. City of Bellevue. 3' After Bailey,
three cases applied the failure to enforce exception broadly, holding local
governments potentially liable because they failed to enforce laws when
122. Id. at 80, 930 P.2d at 963.
123. Id. at 76, 930 P.2d at 961.
124. The special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine should not be confused with
the different special relationship which arises from government supervision of offenders, discussed
supra Part l.B. .d-e.
125. Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash. 2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988).
126. 100 Wash. 2d 299, 306, 669 P.2d 468, 473 (1983).
127. Radach v. Gunderson, 39 Wash. App. 392, 695 P.2d 128 (1985).
128. Taylor, Ill Wash. 2d at 167, 759 P.2d at 451 (1988). Following Taylor, the special
relationship exception has been significant only in cases involving 911 calls. Beal v. City of Seattle,
134 Wash. 2d 769, 954 P.2d 237 (1998), and Noakes v. City of Seattle, 77 Wash. App. 2d 694, 895
P.2d 842 (1995), seemed to weaken the express assurances requirement by implying that statements
that police would be dispatched were an express assurance of protection.
129. Smith v. State, 59 Wash. App. 808, 802 P.2d 133 (1990).
130. 108 Wash. 2d 262, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987).
131. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975). This was a case in which a city electrical inspector
failed to order disconnection of electrical service, as required by the city code, after discovering
dangerous wiring.
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they had knowledge of violations. 132 These cases overlooked the
requirement of a statute making enforcement mandatory, an error not
corrected until McKasson v. State, which held that the State was not
liable for failing to enforce financial reporting requirements when the
securities act did not mandate specific enforcement actions.,
33
Subsequent cases strictly applied the mandatory duty element along with
the actual knowledge element, resulting in little liability under this
exception. 34
Between 1974 and 1998, the Washington Supreme Court created
broad liability for regulatory and police functions, but thereafter
narrowed this liability by adopting the public duty doctrine. The doctrine
became a means to determine if regulatory schemes created an obligation
to individuals or only an obligation to improve regulated areas without
guaranteeing compliance.
The public duty doctrine had one anomaly: it protected officials
when they declined to act, but did not protect them when they acted. For
instance, in Miotke v. City of Spokane, officials were liable to downriver
homeowners for modifying a pollution permit to allow a sewer plant
upgrade, even though the duty of the officials was to act for the public
welfare and not for the benefit of individuals. 35 If the permit had
allowed the discharges, and if officials had declined to modify it at the
request of the homeowners, the public duty doctrine would arguably
have protected the officials. This anomaly occurs because Washington
courts analyze affirmative regulatory acts under this state's narrow
discretionary immunity rule, without considering that the duty is owed to
the public and not individuals.' 36 The anomaly does not occur in
jurisdictions where discretionary immunity protects decisions about
matters of public interest.
d Liability for Highway Design and Improvement
Traditional highway liability was based on alleged failures to
maintain or repair the highway itself or to install signs warning of
132. Coffel v. Clallam County, 58 Wash. App. 517, 794 P.2d 513 (1990); Waite v. Whatcom
County, 54 Wash. App. 682, 775 P.2d 967 (1989); Livingston v. City of Everett, 50 Wash. App. 655,
751 P.2d 1199(1988).
133. 55 Wash. App. 18, 24, 776 P.2d 971, 974 (1989).
134. See, e.g., Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass'n Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume, 115 Wash. 2d
506, 799 P.2d 250 (1990).
135. 101 Wash. 2d 307, 330, 678 P.2d 803,816 (1984).
136. For instance, Haslundv. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976), and King v.
City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 246, 525 P.2d 228, 232-33 (1974), analyzed regulatory decisions
on building permits under discretionary immunity whereas Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574
P.2d 1190 (1978), and Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (1976), analyzed alleged
failures of building officials to act as a public duty doctrine issue.
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conditions not apparent to drivers, not on theories that the road was
designed improperly or should have been improved. Case law had
accepted state and federal highway standards, particularly the national
highway signing manual, 37 as establishing the standard of care for
government. 138 In the late 1970s, several cases expanded the bases for
liability for traditional highway claims and permitted new claims on
broader theories of liability.
In Tanguma v. Yakima County,139 the plaintiff drove into a canal to
avoid colliding with another vehicle which allegedly occupied more than
its share of an old bridge. The driver sued the county on theories that the
bridge should have met newer standards for width or had signs warning
of the dangerously narrow width and allegedly limited sight distance.
140
Tanguma reversed a summary judgment granted based on lack of duty,
and while Tanguma did not announce any specific new highway duty, it
was significant because there was no road defect in the traditional sense,
and the court allowed the case to proceed on a signage theory when the
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) indicated that the
bridge did not require a warning sign. 14 Unlike earlier cases, Tanguma
appeared to allow liability based on expert testimony that signage could
have been better, without a specific showing that the sign manual or any
other highway standard was violated.
Though Tanguma rejected the argument that a duty existed to
replace a bridge with one meeting current standards, the decision in
Boeing Co. v. State142 accepted failure to improve a road as a basis for
liability. Boeing involved a truck that was damaged driving through a
substandard railway underpass with a sign stating its clearance. The truck
driver knew the clearance, but underestimated his load height. 43 Boeing
allowed liability on theories that the city could have installed special
warning devices for the underpass or rebuilt the highway. 144 Boeing was
a major expansion of liability because it recognized claims of liability for
older highways that did not meet current standards so long as claimants
could present expert testimony that those highways were extra-hazardous
137. The State of Washington adopts by law the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
published by the Federal Highway Administration, WASH. REV. CODE § 47.36.030 (1977); see also
MANUAL OF UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES, available at http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/biz/
trafficoperations/mutcd.htm (last updated Mar. 25, 2004).
138. See Kitt v. Yakima County, 93 Wash. 2d 670, 611 P.2d 1234 (1980); Schneider v. Yakima
County, 65 Wash. 2d 352, 397 P.2d 411 (1964).
139. 18 Wash. App. 555, 569 P.2d 1225 (1977).
140. Id. at 557, 569 P.2d at 1227.
141. Id. at 557-60, 569 P.2d at 1227-28.
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or inherently dangerous. Boeing, like Tanguma, also did not treat
accepted highway sign standards as determinative of liability.
Highway liability expanded again in Stewart v. State145 on a claim
that the State was negligent because it did not have lighting on an
interstate highway bridge. After rejecting discretionary immunity,
Stewart held that the State could be liable for negligent design. 146 Stewart
did not limit liability to claims that the bridge was not constructed to
accepted design standards for freeways. Rather, Stewart indicated that
liability might be based on expert testimony that a different design for
lighting on the bridge would have been "good practice. 147 Unlike
Morgan v. State,148 decided 12 years earlier, Stewart did not look to
federal or state design standards for such bridges to determine if the State
should have liability.
Two later cases somewhat reduced the new highway design
liability. In McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman,149 plaintiffs alleged that the
State was negligent in failing to improve an older road by repaving it and
by adding modem median barriers. McCluskey indicated that it might be
proper for the State to present a funding limitation defense on claims for
failure to make capital improvements.' 50 More significantly, McCluskey
contained dicta implying that discretionary immunity would protect
against claims that arise from the State's failure to allocate funds for
capital improvements through its statutory priority array process.' 5' A
county case resolved a similar issue on the basis of duty rather than
immunity. Ruff v. County of King, held that the county had no duty to
upgrade an older road to current safety standards unless the road itself
was inherently dangerous or deceptive to a prudent driver. "
2
By the late 1970s, the waiver produced new liability for the
governmental functions of road design and improvement. The
Washington Supreme Court later limited liability for failure to upgrade
older facilities, but did not limit liability for negligent original design,
145.92 Wash. 2d 285, 597 P.2d 101 (1979).
146. Id. at 294, 597 P.2d at 106-07.
147. Id. at 293, 597 P.2d at 106.
148. 71 Wash. 2d 826, 430 P.2d 947 (1967).
149. 125 Wash. 2d 1, 882 P.2d 157 (1994).
150. Id. at 8-9, 882 P.2d 161.
151. Capital improvements to state highways are controlled by priority and funding procedures
governing the state Department of Transportation, the Transportation Commission, and the
Legislature. WASH. REV. CODE § 47.05 (1994). The supreme court has also held that evidence of
funding considerations is material in government cases involving capital improvements because
funding is an issue in government liability cases, even if it would not be an issue in private liability
cases. See Bodin v. Stanwood, 130 Wash. 2d 726, 927 P.2d 240 (1996). Thus, one of the results of
Washington's narrow discretionary immunity is that government budget issues are tried to juries.
152. 125 Wash. 2d 697, 707-08, 887 P.2d 886, 891 (1995).
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even if the design complied with highway design standards. 153 There was
inconsistency in this result. If a public agency was sued for failure to
improve a road by rebuilding it to meet a standard adopted after the
road's construction, the case would be dismissed based on Ruff because
there would be no duty to upgrade the road with features not required by
standards when the road was constructed. However, if an agency was
sued for its alleged negligence in failing to incorporate these same
features at the time of construction, the lawsuit could proceed based on
Stewart if the court heard testimony that it would have been "good
practice" for the agency to design the road differently.
e. Liability for Release and Supervision of
Mental Patients and Criminal Offenders
During the early 1980s, Washington courts began to consider
claims that the government was liable for the crimes and accidents of
released mental patients and criminal offenders. Over the next fifteen
years, several cases created liability for these governmental functions.
The issue of liability for actions of released mental patients arose
first. In 1983, Petersen v. State held that the State could be liable for an
automobile accident caused by a former mental patient. 5 4 The basis of
liability was a doctor's decision not to petition the court for an extra
ninety-day commitment, and the doctor's failure to report probation
violations on a burglary. 155 Petersen held that discretionary immunity did
not protect the doctor's decisions.15 6 Petersen then held that the doctor's
"special relationship' ' 57 with the patient created a duty to protect anyone
foreseeably endangered by the patient's drug-related mental problems.' 
58
Considering the civil commitment statutes and the unusual facts of
Petersen, the court's holding in that case is an odd one. In Petersen, the
patient had not been committed because he was dangerous to others or a
bad driver, but because he was gravely disabled and a danger to
153. Design of highways is commonly excepted from liability in other states if the design
conforms substantially with accepted standards. See IDAHO CODE § 6-904(7) (1971). Other states
also provide that failure to make capital improvements or major repairs is excepted from liability.
154. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 435, 671 P.2d 230, 241 (1983).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 426, 671 P.2d at 236. The term is the same as used for the exception to the public
duty doctrine, but the concept is different. A special relationship under the public duty doctrine is
between the government and the plaintiff, whereas in release and supervision cases, it is between the
government and the released patient or offender and not with the plaintiff, although it creates a duty
running to the plaintiff.
158. The Legislature adopted a statute in 1987 which changed the liability standard from
negligence to gross negligence. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.120 (1987).
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himself.159 State law prohibited holding drug abusers as mental patients
unless they had an ongoing mental health problem, 60 and prohibited
disclosing patient information to third parties, such as probation
officers.' 61 Petersen's willingness to hold the State liable
notwithstanding these circumstances contrasts starkly with Evangelical,
which used foreseeability to avoid state liability for a fire set by an
escapee who had a history of both escape and fire setting. Despite the
unusual nature of its facts and its deviation from the Evangelical
approach, Petersen became the basis for claims that government had a
special relationship with offenders released from correctional facilities.
In the ten years after Petersen, governments, as well as private
treatment facilities, were sued for failure to prevent crimes by offenders
in treatment or under post-release supervision. Several cases were
dismissed on the basis of lack of duty or proximate cause because the
crime was unrelated to the crimes for which the offender was being
treated or supervised. 162 No case decided whether government could have
liability for crimes by offenders under post-release supervision until
1991. Forest v. State held that there was no duty to prevent crimes by
offenders on parole because the purpose of parole was to rehabilitate
offenders and improve public safety generally, and not to protect
individuals.163 Forest found that the failure to enforce exception to the
public duty doctrine did not apply because reporting of violations by
parole officers was discretionary.1 64 Forest stated that creating liability
for parole would be poor public policy because it would negatively affect
the parole system.1
65
159. Peterson, 100 Wn. 2d at 424, 671 P.2d at 235. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1983).
160. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.040 (1983).
161. Former WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (1983).
162. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 68 Wash. App. 294, 841 P.2d 1254 (1992); review denied, 121
Wash. 2d 1018, 854 P.2d 42 (1993) (drunk driving accident by offender with substance abuse
problem, but who was in custody for reasons not related to substance abuse); McKenna v. Edwards,
65 Wash. App. 905, 830 P.2d 385 (1992), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1003 (1992) (drug and
alcohol offender who committed rape and murder); Noonan v. State, 53 Wash. App. 558, 769 P.2d
313 (1989), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1027 (1989) (burglar in alcohol treatment who committed
rape); Baumgart v. Grant County, 50 Wash. App. 671, 750 P.2d 271, review denied, 110 Wash. 2d
1033 (1988) (driving accident by a person with a bad driving record, but in custody only for
burglary). Two of these cases (Noonan and McKenna) analyzed the issue as one of "duty," and two
of the cases (Baumgart and Johnson) used the same analysis, but called the issue "proximate cause."
Also, Melville v. State, 115 Wash. 2d 34, 39-40, 793 P.2d 952, 955 (1990) held that the State did not
have a duty to provide mental health treatment that would prevent an offender from committing
crimes after release.
163. 62 Wash. App. 363, 370, 814 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1991). The analysis in Forest was similar
to the analyses in New York cases.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 369-70, 814 P.2d at 1185. Washington liability would also have been unfair because
the offender was an Oregon parolee receiving interstate supervision. Under Oregon law, an officer
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Forest indirectly rejected the Petersen analysis by analyzing
supervision of offenders as a correctional function done to benefit society
rather than as an activity meant to prevent crimes against individuals.
However, in 1992, Taggart v. State, without overruling Forest, held that
parole officers had a "take charge" relationship with parolees. 166 This
holding created the kind of special relationship discussed in Petersen.
The court stated that "parole officers had a duty to protect others from
reasonably foreseeable dangers engendered by parolees' dangerous
propensities.' 67 Taggart held that neither discretionary immunity nor
quasi-judicial immunity protected the state from liability.' 68 The court
characterized the parole officer's supervision of parolees as
administrative rather than quasi-judicial in nature. 169
Taggart was remarkably different from case law in other
jurisdictions. Although the court discussed authority from other states, it
relied on cases which contained special circumstances, such as
disobedience of a court order, giving permission for prohibited
employment, or failure to provide information.' 70  When other
jurisdictions directly considered whether parole officers had a duty to
prevent crime by offenders, they found that there was no duty or that
there was discretionary immunity.' 7' Taggart did cite two cases creating
a duty to prevent crimes by offenders, but one of those cases was
overridden by legislation and one has not been followed and is on the
verge of being overruled. 72 Subsequent to Taggart, other jurisdictions
continued to find immunity or create no duty for this governmental
function. 
173
supervising an offender is not considered to have control over an offender and is not liable for an
offender's crimes. There is also a $100,000 limit on any claims against the state. See Kim v.
Multnomah County, 970 P.2d 631 (Or. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (1987).
166. 118 Wash. 2d 195, 222, 822 P.2d 243, 257-58 (1992).
167. Id. at 224, 822 P.2d at 257-58.
168. Id. at 228-29, 822 P.2d at 260.
169. Id. at 205-6, 822 P.2d at 248.
170. Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976); Acevedo v. Pima County Adult Prob. Dep't, 142 Ariz. 319, 960 P.2d 38 (Ariz. 1984);
Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968).
171. See, e.g., Berling v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 557 N.E.2d 174 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1989);
C.L. v. Olson, 422 N.W.2d 614 (Wis. 1988).
172. Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755 (Idaho 1986), overridden by IDAHO CODE § 6.904A
(1988); Dep 't ofCorrs. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986), has not been applied in later cases,
and State v. Sandsness, 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003), indicates that it will likely be overruled if
challenged.
173. See, e.g., Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998). In Schmidt, the Kansas
Supreme Court stated: "We reject this overbroad construction [Taggart] which escalates the State's
responsibility to that of a virtual guarantor of the safety of each and every one of its citizens from
illegal and unlawful actions of every parolee or person released from custody under any type or kind
of supervision." Schmidt, 961 P.2d at 687.
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Taggart created an expansive liability. The court expressed concern
that liability might adversely affect the ability of parole officers to make
decisions about the liberty of parolees and the safety of the public. 174 To
mitigate this problem, Taggart created an immunity for parole
supervision "if [the officer's] action is in furtherance of a statutory duty
and in substantial compliance with the directives of superiors and
relevant regulatory guidelines."'' 75 Three years later, Savage v. State
effectively removed the immunity by holding that it protected only
parole officers personally and not the State. 1
76
Taggart also expressed concern over the implications of its decision
by stating that the Legislature could deal with problems created by the
court's decision. Before the waiver, the Washington Supreme Court
declined to create liability for the State and deferred the policy issues
implicit in government liability to the Legislature. 77 After the open-
ended waiver, the court no longer deferred policy decisions on
expansions of government liability to the Legislature, but made those
decisions itself with the suggestion that the Legislature could deal with
any resulting problems.
Later cases expanded Taggart. Bishop v. Miche17 8 and Hertog v.
City of Seattle, 179 for example, held that county and city probation and
pretrial release officers could be liable for failing to monitor and report
violations to the court.' 80 Bishop and Hertog rejected arguments that
officers reporting to the court had quasi-judicial immunity.' 8' However,
Bishop ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs claim because the court had
broken the chain of causation by continuing the offender on probation
after a full report by the probation officer two days before the offender
caused the fatal accident.
18 2
174. Taggart, 118 Wash. 2d at 215, 822 P.2d at 253.
175. Id. at 216, 822 P.2d at 253-4. Dissenting Justice Guy characterized the qualified immunity
as "illusory and nothing more than a negligence standard wrapped like a gift box which contains
sticks and ashes." ld. at 236, 822 P.2d at 263-4 (Guy, J. dissenting).
176. 127 Wash. 2d 434, 441-42, 899 P.2d 1270, 1274 (1995). Savage states that Taggart
created qualified immunity only to protect parole officers from monetary loss, but, as both the
dissent and a law review comment note, Taggart pointed out that all state employees have statutory
indemnity from the state under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92 (2002). Thus, the immunity in Taggart
must have been intended to protect the state. See Kristi Anderson Bjornerud, The Uncertain Scope of
Sovereign Immunity in Washington After Savage v. State, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1069 (1996).
177. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953).
178. 137 Wash. 2d 518, 973 P.2d 465 (1998).
179. 138 Wash. 2d 265, 979 P.2d 400 (1999).
180. Bishop, 137 Wash. 2d at 525-26, 973 P.2d at 469; Hertog, 138 Wash. 2d at 275-76, 979
P.2d at 406-07.
181. Bishop, 137 Wash. 2d at 526, 973 P.2d at 469; Hertog, 138 Wash. 2d at 290-91, 979 P.2d
at 414.
182. Bishop, 137 Wash. 2d at 532, 973 P.2d at 472.
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Bishop and Hertog appeared to reject Savage's holding that the
immunity of the officer does not apply to the government, as there was
evidence in both cases that the officers complied with all directives
governing supervision of the offenders. The courts stated that the
qualified immunity that might protect the officers in this circumstance
would not protect the city and county from claims for their negligence in
adopting the regulations, but did not state that the city and county would
remain liable for the officers' acts.
183
In Hertog,184 the concurring judge argued that Taggart ignored the
reality that officials often lack the means to control dangerous
offenders. 185 The supreme court acknowledged the concurrence, but
declined the invitation to modify Taggart, reiterating that the Legislature
could respond to any liability problems. 186 The court noted that liability
claims did not appear to have been a problem for the state after
Taggart.187 This would change soon after Bishop.
f Social Welfare Liability
By the 1980s, the state's social programs faced claims of liability in
several lawsuits involving programs for dependent children and
investigations of child abuse. 1
88
Babcock v. State8 9 was the first case that imposed liability on a
social program. Babcock involved four girls who had been removed from
the custody of their father by a Louisiana court and placed with their
grandparents in Washington. Due to interference by the father, social
workers removed the girls from their grandparents' home, placing them
instead with their maternal aunt and uncle. 190 Later, the girls reported
abuse by the uncle. 19' The lawsuit claimed that the State had been
negligent because it had not done a criminal background check on the
uncle who had been acquitted of rape some years earlier.' 92 The supreme
court originally affirmed a dismissal because the placements had been
approved by the Washington court following contested hearings.' 93 The
asserted basis for liability was that the social workers had been negligent
183. Id. at 532; Herfog, 138 Wash. 2d. at 278, 979 P.2d at 408.
184. 88 Wash. App. 41, 63, 943 P.2d 1153 (1997) (Agid, J. concurring).
185. Id.
186. Hertog, 138 Wash. 2d. at 278-79, 291, 979 P.2d at 408, 414.
187. Id. at 278-79, 979 P.2d at 408.
188. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34 (1977), the courts can take custody of abandoned,
abused, or neglected children who are defined as "dependent."
189. 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989).
190. Id. at 87, 768 P.2d at 483.
191. Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 90, 768 P.2d 481, 486 (1989).
192. Id. at 91,768 P.2d at 486.
193. Id. at 108, 768 P.2d at 494.
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in preparing reports to the court because they had not discovered the
uncle's acquittal. 194 The court held that the reports to the court must be
protected by prosecutorial and witness immunity in order to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process.' 
95
Two years later, the court reconsidered and held that social workers
did not have absolute immunity.1 96  On reconsideration, the court
considered the social workers' investigation to be separate from the
judicial process. 197 This was a major change from prior law which had
held that prosecutorial and judicial immunity barred claims for
negligence in investigations preceding decisions to prosecute or in
preparing a report to the court. 198 The court's rejection of immunity for
social workers involved in juvenile dependencies opened a large new
area of governmental liability. Justice Dore's dissent argued that the
extent of liability for alleged errors in dependencies could be a problem,
noting that the state had but 850 social workers for 25,000 to 27,000
children in dependencies. 199
Later decisions interpreted Babcock broadly, creating more liability
for governmental child welfare functions. Babcock had dealt only with
the scope of immunity for a child placement decision, not with issues of
duty and negligence, which were to be decided on remand °. 0
194. Id. at 94-95, 768 P.2d at 488.
195. The dependency statutes create a system of shelter care, disposition, and review hearings
in which the court makes decisions concerning removal of children from parents, care of children
while in court custody, and eventual permanent placement of children. The role of social workers is
to act variously as investigators, prosecutors, and service coordinators within the court-directed
system. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34 (1977), 26.44 (1999), 74.13 (1965), 74.15 (1995).
196. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 87, 768 P.2d at 483.
197. Babcock v. State, 116 Wash. 2d 596, 610, 809 P.2d 143, 151 (1991).
198. See, e.g., Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966). The Creelman
court applied prosecutorial immunity to reject a claim that a prosecutor had inadequately
investigated a case. The following two cases held that judicial immunity protected mental health
officials from claims that they had been negligent in making recommendations to courts. Tobis v.
State, 52 Wash. App. 150, 758 P.2d 534 (1988); Bader v. State, 43 Wash. App. 223, 716 P.2d 925
(1986).
199. Babcock did hold that social workers should have a qualified immunity from suit because,
like police officers, they were charged with making decisions that greatly interfered with people's
lives and making difficult decisions under difficult circumstances. Guffey v. State, 103 Wash. 2d
144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984), created a qualified immunity for police officers. This immunity, like
discretionary immunity in jurisdictions other than Washington, would protect social worker
judgments, as long as no statutes or agency procedures were violated and their actions were
"reasonable." In his concurrence, Justice Anderson objected to this qualified immunity as too narrow
and "virtually non-existent and illusory." Justice Anderson's view appears to have been validated by
Waller v. State, 64 Wash. App. 318, 824 P.2d 1225 (1992), review denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1014, 833
P.2d 1390 (1992), and Lesley v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 83 Wash. App. 263, 921 P.2d 1066
(1996), review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1026 (1997), which declined to grant qualified immunity to
judgments made by social workers about investigations.
200. Duty and negligence were contested because state law did not require criminal
background checks for relatives and because the uncle's arrests and acquittal were non-conviction
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Nevertheless, a series of decisions interpreted Babcock as creating a duty
to investigate, which ran in favor of the suspects in investigations.01
Although Babcock stated that social workers would have absolute
immunity if they had initiated a dependency and if all of their
investigative results had been part of an adversary process, the
Washington Court of Appeals held that this language was dicta and did
not create social worker immunity.20 2 In Lesley v. Dep 't of Soc. & Health
Servs., 203 the court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to a
dependency court decision approving removal of children from parents
after contested "shelter care" hearings. However, two years later, in
Tyner v. Dep 't of Soc. & Health Servs.,204 the court held that a social
worker's alleged negligent investigation was not the proximate cause of a
child's removal from her parents, which occurred only after a judge
ordered removal following a hearing.20 5
The cases after Babcock were based on an assumption that the state
owed a tort duty to parties in dependency proceedings. These cases did
not resolve the question of whether statutes created a public duty to
investigate child abuse for the overall benefit of society or a specific duty
to investigate for the benefit of individuals. As noted previously in the
discussion of the public duty doctrine, Yonker v. Dep 't of Soc. & Health
Servs. held that child protective statutes satisfied the legislative intent
data unavailable to non-law enforcement agencies such as the Department of Social and Health
Services. Chief Justice Dore's dissent in Babcock discussed the duty and negligence issues
extensively.
201. Tyner v. Dep't. of Soc. & Health Servs., 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000); Gilliam v.
Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 89 Wash. App. 569, 950 P.2d 20 (1998), review denied, 135 Wash.
2d 1015, 960 P.2d 937 (1998); Lesley, 83 Wash. App. 263, 921 P.2d 1066 (1996); Waller, 64 Wash.
App. 318, 824 P.2d 1225 (1992); Dunning v. Pacerelli, 63 Wash. App. 232, 818 P.2d 34 (1991).
None of these cases acknowledged Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wash. App. 789, 770 P.2d 686 (1989),
which held that state investigation statutes did not create a duty to subjects of investigations.
202. Gilliam, 89 Wash. App. 569, 950 P.2d 20 (1998). This was the conclusion even when a
parent had stipulated to the dependency process and cooperated in the dependency investigation and
resolution through the court process.
203. 83 Wash. App. 263, 921 P.2d 1066 (1996).
204. 92 Wash. App. 504, 963 P.2d 215 (1998), rev'd by Tyner v. Dep't of Soc. & Health
Servs., 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000).
205. Tyner stated that the social worker had presented all the material facts needed by the court
to decide the issue of removal. Tyner distinguished Lesley on the basis that the social worker in
Lesley had removed the child before obtaining a court order, whereas the Tyner social worker had
acted wholly within the judicial process by first obtaining a court order. Tyner was in error on that
point because social workers have no statutory authority to take custody of children without a court
order; only police have this authority and the facts in Lesley, 83 Wash. App. at 266-67, 921 P.2d
1068-69, indicate that a police officer took custody of the child. Tyner was eventually reversed by
the supreme court on the basis that there was a fact question on whether all material facts had been
disclosed to the judge, but the proximate cause defense was left intact. Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1
P.3d 1148.
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exception to the doctrine and created a state tort duty to prevent child
abuse.2 °6
2. Claim and Legal Defense Costs
The total cost of state payments on tort lawsuits and claims rose
steadily from 1974 to 1998. From 1975 to 1979, the tort payouts
averaged approximately $2 million per biennial period, slightly more
than twice the average from the prior ten years.20 7 From that point, the
payouts almost doubled in every biennium, except one, for ten years,
reaching $28 million in the 1987-89 biennium. The payouts averaged
approximately $20 million per biennium from 1989-95 and doubled to
approximately $40 million per biennium from 1995-99.
The increase in tort payouts aligned with decisions expanding
governmental liabilities. The period in the 1980s in which payouts rose
from less than $2 million to $28 million followed cases which narrowed
discretionary immunity and created liabilities for regulatory, police,
correctional, and highway design and improvement functions. The
doubling of payouts after 1995 was consistent with the effect that would
be expected from claims caused by the expansion of social welfare and
correctional liability in Babcock (1991) and Taggart (1992).
In the 1980s, the state resolved ten claims for more than $1 million,
all but two of which involved a vehicle collision or a property claim.
Large claims became more frequent in the 1990s, when twenty-two
claims resolved for more than $1 million between 1990 and 1998. Of
these claims, twelve involved correctional, social welfare, highway
design, or regulatory liabilities, four involved personnel or civil rights
liabilities, and only six involved traditional liabilities.
The new liabilities for correctional and social welfare functions
accounted for a large amount of the increase in claim payouts. The
claims almost always involved murder, violent crimes, sex or physical
abuse, severe neglect, or drunk driving. The claimants were usually
children, disabled, surviving spouses, or crime victims. The fear that
206. 85 Wash. App. 71, 81-82, 930 P.2d 958, 964 (1997). This liability was initially
inconsistent with police liability because the public duty doctrine protected police from liability for
alleged negligence in investigation. The possibility that the State could risk manage its liability by
sending complaints to the police, ended with Rodriguez v. Perez, 99 Wash. App. 439, 994 P.2d 874
(2000), review denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1020, 10 P.3d 1073 (2000), which held that police have the
same liability as social workers.
207. Data for biennia before Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 are drawn from historical records
maintained by the Attorney General's Torts Division of data originally compiled by the Office of
Financial Management (OFM). Summary data after FY 1985 are drawn from the 1989-91 and 1999-
01 Risk Management Biennial Reports prepared by the Division of Risk Management of the
Department of General Administration.
Seattle University Law Review
sympathetic juries would return high awards to plaintiffs spawned
increasingly high settlements in such cases. The three largest payments
on claims filed between 1990 and 1998 were two jury verdicts and one
settlement, together totaling over $29 million and involving a murder by
a parolee and claims of sexual and physical abuse in group or adult
family homes.2 °8
State legal defense costs remained modest throughout the 1970s. By
1980, the Torts Division had seven lawyers, eleven investigators, and
other support staff, all on a biennial budget of approximately $2 million.
The state's staff remained relatively constant until the rapid increase in
liabilities in the mid-1980s. In 1987, a management study recommended
a large increase in tort defense due to the number, cost, and complexity
of state liabilities. 209 Torts Division staff increased to eighty-five,
including over thirty lawyers. This staff remained essentially the same
until 1999, with a budget increasing from $11 million to $20 million a
biennium over that period. Tort claim costs declined for several years
after the increase in the state's tort defense effort. There was an apparent
correlation between the declining claim costs and increased defense
efforts.
In contrast to the small and stable tort claim and defense costs from
1961 to 1974, the costs in the next twenty-five years rose substantially
and consistently. In 1974, the total biennial cost of state tort liability was
approximately $2 million and stable. Twenty-five years later, the
biennial cost was $65 million or more and increasing steadily.210
3. Tort Reform in the 1980s
Local government reacted quickly to the liability for governmental
activities and the increase in claim costs. In his June 1978 remarks to
municipal and prosecuting attorneys, the Seattle City Attorney viewed
the waiver less positively than did the Attorney General in 1961:
208. The $6.4 million jury verdict in the case involving a murder by a former parolee came
shortly after Bishop v. Miche observed that liability under Taggart did not appear to have created
problems for the state.
209. LEGAL SERVICES MANAGEMENT STUDY, OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., PHASE I,
RECOMMENDED STAFFING LEVELS, Price Waterhouse (1987).
210. This cost did not include risk management and claim adjustment staff at the OFM, the
DOT, and other agencies. The Price Waterhouse study had recommended a major increase in risk
management. Legislation established a risk management and claim adjustment office at the
Department of General Administration (DGA), which moved to the OFM in 1999. 1989 Wash. Laws
419. Large agencies also have risk management staff. The cost also did not include premiums ($3
million in 1993) for the excess insurance policy that the state began purchasing in FY 1993 to cover
claims over $5 million. If the 1974 cost was adjusted using the price deflator, supra note 77, the
1998 tort cost would have been approximately $5 million rather than $65 million.
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The years since 1961 have not been kind to the old King in the
State of Washington. He was hit and run by the legislature with the
adoption of RCW 4.92.090 and RCW 4.96.010, kicked in the shins by
the Supreme Court when it struck down our claims statutes, and
suffered a heart attack with the adoption of comparative negligence. If
there is any life left in the old boy, he is now drowning in the rising tide
of lawyers and litigation.
The cities and counties in the State of Washington are now
suffering the consequences of the King's demise. Million dollar claims
and unending theories of liability haunt nearly every government
decision. Each year the governments we serve expand their
responsibilities and regulations (from SEPA to Shorelines to Public
Disclosure to traffic lights), yet each year there are increasing numbers
of plaintiffs who appreciate our vulnerability. Comprehensive
insurance coverage at affordable prices is rapidly becoming a thing of
the past.2'
The Seattle City Attorney proposed legislation assigning government
liability only for activities comparable to those in the private sector, but
not for uniquely governmental activities. The proposed legislation
contained liability limitations for regulations (licensing, permits,
inspections), road and facility design, fire protection, and failure to
prevent crime.
Local government liability issues lead the Washington State House
and Senate Local Government Committees to conduct a 1979 study on
local government insurance problems. 2 In addition to recommending
legislation facilitating risk management and risk pooling, the study
recommended changes in substantive law. The most significant proposal
was to eliminate joint and several liability for government so that it
would not be the "deep pocket" when it was joined as a defendant with
211. Douglas N. Jewett, Submission of A Working Draft of Legislation Limiting Municipal Tort
Liability, presentation to Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys and Washington
State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (June 15, 27, 1978). The reference to the claims statute
related to Hunter v. North Mason Sch. Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975), which held that
time limits on government claims were unconstitutional under the state constitution, despite article
II, section 26 of the Constitution, which permitted the Legislature to direct the manner of suing the
state. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983), later held that cost bonds in state
tort cases were also unconstitutional.
212. Concerns about these issues also arose in other states with early waivers of immunity.
Although California had re-imposed immunities for governmental functions, courts had interpreted
the immunities narrowly, the immunities had eroded, and claims and large judgments had increased
in areas not formerly subject to liability. Insurance companies in California viewed municipal
liability as uncertain, with risks which were unstable, unpredictable, and often hard to manage due to
their inherent risk. Staff Background Paper, Government Liability, (June 1977); California Citizens'
Commission on Tort Reform at 52-53, 86-89, 111-12, INDEP. COMM'N REPORT (1977).
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others who had no resources. The study also endorsed bills to provide for
contribution among tortfeasors and to establish a 180-day claim filing
deadline. Additionally, it proposed bills allowing governmental
"affirmative defenses" based on compliance with standards in road and
facility cases and lack of notice in inspection cases.
By the early 1980s, the liability for governmental functions created
concerns for the state. In 1984, the Attorney General wrote a letter to
legislative leaders suggesting that they consider immunities for certain
government functions.213 The letter emphasized that the loss of almost all
discretionary immunity created extensive liability for judgment calls by
public employees in areas of design, law enforcement, and social
services. It further emphasized that most tort lawsuits did not involve the
direct liability of the state, but involved indirect liability on a theory that
the state failed to prevent another party's conduct.
In the ten years prior to the 1984 letter, the Legislature enacted two
major tort law changes, the first of which increased government liability,
the second of which did not.214 The Legislature did not respond to the
suggestions for government-specific tort reform, but events in the next
two years led to a general tort reform that decreased government liability.
In 1985 and 1986, there was a "hard" insurance market caused by
declining interest rates, past competition and rate decreases in the
insurance industry, and insurance underwriting losses caused by
expanding liabilities in many corporate, professional, and public
enterprises.215  This change caused large premium increases or
unavailability of insurance for enterprises with unpredictable risks.216 In
Washington, the "insurance crisis" produced a coalition of self-insured
213. Ken Eikenberry, Letter to Legislative Leaders Re: Government Liability (Apr. 3, 1984).
214. In 1974, the Legislature adopted comparative negligence rather than contributory
negligence, which permitted claims against highway agencies by drivers who formerly had no claim.
1973 Wash. Laws 138. In 1981, the Legislature allowed joint tortfeasors to sue each other for
contribution, but this did not help public entities who were deep pocket defendants in cases with
insolvent codefendants. 1981 Wash. Laws 27.
215. RICHARD K. WILLARD & ROBERT L. WILLMORE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (Feb. 1986). An ad hoc
committee of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) disagreed with the conclusion
that increases in tort liability had a connection with increasing insurance costs, but the experience of
the state of Washington as a large uninsured entity was consistent with the Justice Department report
and not the NAAG report. See FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI, NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTYS. GEN. AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF
UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986). Independent studies of
the 1985-86 insurance issues revealed that routine cases, such as automobile claims, were not
growing, but that "high stakes" torts were growing much faster in frequency and cost. See RAND
CORPORATION, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION, THE STORY
BEHIND THE STATISTICS (1987).
216. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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businesses, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and professionals
that successfully supported tort reform. 2 17 The two most significant
reforms were a general damages cap and a change from joint and several
liability to proportional liability in cases in which a plaintiff had some
fault.
2 18
In 1989, the Washington Supreme Court held that the damage cap
was unconstitutional, 2 ' 9 but left joint and several liability unscathed.
Proportional liability mitigated the effect of the loss of contributory
negligence in cases against governments. If a plaintiff who had fault
joined the government as a defendant with an uninsured driver or
criminal, the government would only pay for its share of fault, which was
often small.22 ° While the change in joint and several liability probably
helped lower tort payments in the early 1990s, much of the benefit of this
reform was lost when Welch v. Southland held that liability could not be
apportioned to intentional tortfeasors under RCW 4.22.221 This holding
prevented governments from apportioning fault to criminals and drunk
drivers who were often codefendants in the most expensive cases.
C. Washington Government Liability Law: 1999-2005
In the last six years, government liability has not expanded as
rapidly as it did over the prior twenty-five years. While broad liabilities
remain, certain governmental liabilities were curtailed, particularly in the
area of offender supervision and child welfare. In contrast to mild
retrenchment in those areas, liability for governmental highway design
decisions has not receded.
1. Case Law Developments
a. Duty and Public Duty
Many cases which expanded governmental liability, such as
Petersen v. State,222 created new duties without reference to or in spite of
the statutes governing the public agency. Recent cases have done the
opposite by looking at governing statutes to determine if an agency has a
tort duty. For instance, in Murphy v. State,22 3 a sheriff sued the Pharmacy
217. 1986 Wash. Laws 305. See Talmadge & Peterson, In Search of a Proper Balance, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 259 (1986).
218. 1986 Wash. Laws 305 at §§ 401,501.
219. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
220. If a plaintiff had no fault, the government would be responsible for the fault of an
insolvent codefendant.
221. 134 Wash. 2d 629, 630, 952 P.2d 162, 163 (1998).
222. 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
223. 115 Wash. App. 297, 62 P.3d 533 (2003).
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Board for negligence in disclosing his confidential prescription records
to support an unsuccessful prosecution. The Murphy court, deciding
whether there was a duty to protect the confidentiality of the records by
carefully examining pharmacy statutes, held that pharmacy statutes
allowed disclosure to the prosecutor despite a Pharmacy Board practice
224 UtmtlMrh ttdtaof following medical privacy statutes. Ultimately, Murphy stated that
agencies are creatures of statute whose duties are determined by the
Legislature, not by their employees.225
Application of the public duty doctrine has remained consistent
since the late 1990s. There have been no new cases applying the
legislative intent exception. Halleran v. State 226 is demonstrative.
Halleran involved a lawsuit claiming negligent investigation by the State
Securities Division, and the court reiterated that the failure to enforce
exception requires a mandatory statutory duty to act rather than
discretionary enforcement authority.22 7 The Washington Supreme Court
continues to hold that statements by 911 operators can fall within the
228special relationship exception and create a duty to prevent crime.
However, Sinks v. Russell229 limits the duty to situations in which the 911
call indicates that a crime is imminent rather than indicating simply that
police assistance is desired.2 30
The public duty doctrine remains unevenly applied to affirmative
acts by officials. In Borden v. City of Olympia,231 plaintiffs sued the city
after it approved a private storm water system that flooded on
neighboring property. Even though the city did not own or operate the
system, Borden held that the public duty doctrine did not apply because
the city's role was "proprietary," not regulatory, as it was involved in
financing and design assistance.23 2 In contrast, Babcock v. Mason County
Fire Dist. held that the public duty doctrine protected a fire district from
liability for alleged negligent decisions about how to fight a fire, a
markedly different treatment of affirmative acts. 233 This holding was a
rare decision applying the doctrine to protect against liability for acts
rather than failures to act. If the officials had relied on discretionary
224. Id. at 304-5, 62 P.3d at 537.
225. Id. at 317, 62 P.3d at 543.
226. 123 Wash. App. 701, 98 P.3d 52 (2004).
227. Id. at 714, 98 P.3d at 58.
228. Bratton v. Welp, 145 Wash. 2d 572, 39 P.3d 959 (2002).
229. 109 Wash. App. 299, 34 P.3d 1243 (2001).
230. Id. at 302-3, 34 P.3d at 1245.
231. 113 Wash. App. 359, 53 P.3d 1020 (2002).
232. Id. at 371, 53 P.3d at 1026.
233. 144 Wash. 2d 774, 793, 30 P.3d 1261, 1272 (2001).
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immunity rather than on the public duty doctrine, they likely would have
been found liable because firefighting decisions are not policy decisions.
b. Correctional and Social Welfare Liability
Taggart v. State continues to hold the government liable for crimes
committed by offenders under probation or post-release supervision.234
However, liability has been reduced by decisions that require proof that
better supervision would have prevented the crime.
Taggart and subsequent cases dealt with duty and immunity issues
but did not discuss how a plaintiff would prove that better supervision
would prevent a crime. The assumption seemed to be that the plaintiff
would show supervision violations that should have resulted in the
offender being incarcerated. Two cases have now established that
requirement. First, Bell v. State held that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that "but for" negligent supervision, the new crime would not
have occurred. 235 The court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the State
on the issue of causation, the basis of which was lack of evidence that the
Parole Board would have revoked parole had violations been reported.236
Next, Estate of Borden v. Dep 't of Correction237 made the causation
requirement even more stringent. Borden reversed a plaintiff verdict
because there was no evidence that the judge would have jailed the
offender if alleged violations had been reported, no evidence that any jail
sentence would have coincided with the date of the crime, and no
evidence that the prosecutor would have noted the violations for
hearing.238 Borden is significant because modern post-release systems
provide for a return to jail only for short periods.239 Additionally, the case
demonstrated just how difficult it is to prove that revocations of
probation or release would have occurred when the revocation decisions
are discretionary judicial or administrative decisions.
240Couch v. Dep't of Corrections, another recent case, placed a
second limitation on offender supervision, holding that the duty to
supervise is defined largely by requirements imposed by statutes and
234. 118 Wash. 2d 195, 219, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (1992).
235. 147 Wash. 2d 166, 179, 52 P.3d 503, 510 (2002).
236. Id. at 183,52 P.3d at 512.
237. 122 Wash. App. 227, 95 P.3d 764 (2004), review denied, 154 Wash. 2d 1003, 114 P.3d
1198 (2005).
238. Id. at 246-47, 95 P.3d at 774.
239. The Sentence Reform Act provides 12 different sanctions for offenders who violate
release conditions, only one of which is jail, which is limited to 60 days per violation. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.634 (2004).
240. 113 Wash. App. 556, 54 P.3d 197 (2002), review denied, 149 Wash. 2d 1012, 69 P.3d 874
(2003).
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court orders. 24' The court concluded that the state was not liable for a
murder by an offender who was being supervised only for the purpose of
collecting unpaid court costs and fines, thus limiting liability for offender
supervision to crimes that are related to behaviors governed by the court
orders and statutes under which the offender is supervised.242 However,
the law is not entirely settled because a later case, Joyce v. State,243 did
not follow Couch, holding that the state had a duty to prevent an
automobile accident by an offender who was allegedly in violation of
reporting conditions related to third degree assault and possession of
stolen property convictions, but who had no convictions related to
driving.244 The Supreme Court declined review in Couch but granted it in
Joyce.245
One new case removed an apparent statutory immunity for
community notification about sex offenders when a statute246 allowed
local law enforcement agencies to release sex offender information, but
provided that there was no liability for failure to release such
information. This case, Osborn v. Mason County, held that the immunity
did not apply to an alleged failure to give notification because it was
qualified by the phrase "except as otherwise provided by law. 247 Osborn
concluded that the "other law" could be the tort law rescue doctrine. The
result is that common law tort liability can be an exception to statutory
immunity from tort liability.
248
Several decisions have narrowed social welfare liability in a similar
manner to correctional liability. No decision has renounced the liabilities
created after Babcock, but decisions limit those liabilities in a variety of
contexts.
241, Id. at 564, 54 P.3d at 201.
242. Id. at 571, 54 P.3d at 205.
243. 116 Wash. App. 569, 75 P.3d 548 (2003), review granted, 150 Wash, 2d 1032, 84 P.3d
1229 (2004).
244. Id. at 594, P.3d at 561.
245. Joyce based its duty holding on the foreseeability that an offender with mental health
problems would have an automobile accident. Murphy v. State, 115 Wash. App, 297, 62 P.3d 533
(2003), rejected foreseeability as a basis for duty, holding that foreseeability is a limitation on a duty
rather than a source of a duty. A case from another division of the Court of Appeals has applied
Couch and distinguished Joyce. In Estate of Davis v. State, 127 Wash. App. 833, 113 P.3d 487
(2005), the court held that the state had no duty to prevent a property crimes offender from
committing murder. The court distinguished Joyce by stating that no reasonable jury could find the
Davis murder foreseeable. The court reached this conclusion despite evidence of the offender's
mental health problems, which had been Joyce's basis for finding that an unrelated crime was
foreseeable.
246. 1990 Wash. Laws 3.
247. 122 Wash. App. 823, 835, 95 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2004), review granted, 154 Wash. 2d
1002, 95 P.3d 1257 (2005).
248. Id. at 837, 95 P.3d at 1265.
[Vol. 29:1
2005] Washington's Experiment with Governmental Liability 39
Pettis v. State held that the duty to investigate child abuse runs only
to parents and children.2 49 Third parties who are subject to investigation
have no right to sue for negligent investigation.2 50 In a reversal of
approach from cases over the past twenty years, Pettis also stated that
any extension of liability was a policy matter to be deferred to the
Legislature. 251 MW v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. 252 further limited
the duty to investigate. M W held that the duty applies only to claims by
parents or children for negligent removal, negligent failure to remove, or
negligent placement in harmful foster care, but not to claims that the
conduct of the investigation itself caused an injury. 253 M W, like many
recent cases, is notable because it carefully examined statutes before
reaching its conclusion on the scope of duty. Terrell C. v. Dep 't of Soc.
& Health Servs. similarly relied on statutes to hold that the duty to act to
protect abused children does not extend to protecting other children from
wrongs caused by the abused child.254 Terrel C. rejected a claim that the
state had a special relationship with an abused child which created an
obligation, analogous to that in Taggart, to prevent wrongs by the
child. 5
A recent case also gave collateral estoppel effect to a dependency
256court order, something that Lesley v. Dep 't of Soc. & Health Servs.
refused to do. Miles v. Child Protective Servs.2 57 held that an agreed
dependency order estopped parents from claiming, in a later lawsuit
against the State, that their children had not been abused.25 8
Additionally, a recent local government case expanded social
welfare liability. The court in Caulfield v. Kitsap County held that a
county social worker had a special relationship with a disabled plaintiff
approved for in-home care funding, and that this relationship gave the
county an obligation to oversee the home assistance provided by a third-
party hired by the plaintiff.2 5 9 This holding potentially widens the state's
liability because programs to fund self-directed services for independent
249. 98 Wash. App. 553, 562-3, 990 P.3d 453, 458-9 (1999).
250. Pettis was the first case to cite Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wn. App. 789, 770 P.2d 686 (1989),
which had reached this conclusion ten years earlier.
251. 98 Wash. App. at 560, 990 P.3d at 457.
252. 149 Wash. 2d 589, 70 P.3d 954 (2003).
253. Id. at 602, 70 P.3d at 970.
254. 120 Wash. App. 20, 25-6, 84 P.3d 899, 902, review denied, 152 Wash. 2d 1018, 101 P.3d
109 (2004).
255. Id.
256. 83 Wash. App. 263, 921 P.2d 1066 (1996).
257. 102 Wash. App. 142, 6 P.3d 112 (2000).
258. Miles distinguished Lesley v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 83 Wn. App. 263, 921 P.2d
1066 (1996), on the basis that the Lesley shelter care order was not final and appealable.
259. 108 Wash. App. 242, 249, 29 P.3d 738, 742 (2001).
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elderly and disabled are growing. Statutes authorizing the funding do not
provide that recipients are government wards or that their care is
managed by government. 260 Caulfeld is different from recent cases
because it determined duty without examining statutes governing such
financial assistance programs.
Correctional and social welfare liability might be reduced by a
decision interpreting the 1986 Tort Reform Act. Tegman v. Accid. &
Med. Invest., Inc. held that damages caused by intentional tortfeasors
must be segregated from damages caused by fault-based conduct and
cannot be collected from negligent codefendants of intentional
tortfeasors. 261 This holding means that governments do not have to pay
the share of damages which a jury assigns to intentional tortfeasors who
are codefendants or responsible entities in tort lawsuits. Tegman
potentially reduces liability for large claims based on criminal conduct or
drunk driving by third parties.
c. Highway Liability
While recent cases reduce some governmental liabilities, highway
design liability remains broad. In Owen v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R.
Co.,262 the plaintiffs were motorists in a traffic backup extending across
multiple railroad tracks on a city street. When a train approached,
motorists in front of the plaintiffs moved off of the tracks, but the
plaintiffs pulled onto the tracks and were hit by the train.263 The crossing
had the warning signals and gates required by standards, as well as signs
warning motorists not to stop on the tracks.264 Owen held that the city
could be liable because it had not adopted safety measures beyond those
required by standards.265 Owen is similar to Stewart v. State266 because it
creates liability for failing to design facilities to exceed standards.
A second case expanded the duty of care owed by governments for
road maintenance. Although case law often proved inconsistent, many
cases, as well as Washington Pattern Instruction 140.01, provided that a
city's duty to maintain and sign streets was limited to "persons using
them in a proper manner and exercising ordinary care for their own
safety. 267 Keller v. City of Spokane268 eliminated this qualification of the
260. 1999 Wash. Laws 336; 1989 Wash. Laws 427.
261. 150 Wash. 2d 102, 108, 75 P.3d 497, 499 (2003).
262. 153 Wash. 2d 780, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005).
263. Id. at 784-5, 108 P.3d at 1221-2.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 790, 108 P.3d at 1225.
266.92 Wash. 2d 285, 597 P.2d 101 (1979).
267. WASH. PATrERN JURY INSTR. Civil §140.01 (3d ed. 1991).
268. 146 Wash. 2d 237, 44 P.3d 345 (2002).
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duty because it conflicted with the abolition of comparative negligence.
However, Keller declined to remove the qualification that the city's duty
was to keep the streets safe only for "ordinary travel. 26 9
Liability for lack of capital improvements to highways has been
reduced by federal highway laws. The Highway Safety Acts of 1966 and
1973 required states to develop safety data, including a computerized
collision report database, to support funding requests.270 The plaintiffs
used this data to claim that states had a duty to make capital
improvements to older roads.27' Congress concluded that this liability
had a negative effect on participation in the federal program and enacted
a statute prohibiting use of federal safety data in tort lawsuits. 272 In 2001,
the Washington Supreme Court held that this statute was
unconstitutional.273 The United States Supreme Court reversed that
decision, holding that the statute was an exercise of Commerce Clause
power because of its relationship to federal highway safety issues.2 74 The
result is that state courts must apply the federal statute. The federal
government has thereby indirectly restricted a major governmental
liability in Washington.
2. Claim and Legal Defense Costs
Although the expansion of government liability slowed in the last
six years, state claim costs continued to rise. Claim payouts were $50
million in the 1999-2001 biennium, $119 million in the 2001-2003
biennium, and almost $64 million in the 2003-2005 biennium.275 In
addition, the self-insured retention (SIR) 276 on the state's excess
insurance policy increased in FY 2001 from $5 million to $25 million per
claim on DSHS/DOC cases and $15 million per claim on cases for all
other state agencies. The current premium for the policy is over $10
million per biennium.
269. The limitation of the duty to motorists using a street for ordinary travel is consistent with
cases holding that governments have no duty to protect motorists from extremely careless driving.
See, e.g., Braegelmann v. County of Snohomish, 53 Wash. App. 381, 766 P.2d 1137 (1989); Klein v.
City of Seattle, 41 Wash. App. 636, 705 P.2d 806 (1985).
270. See 23 C.F.R. § 924.9 (2005).
271. WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY, KUHLMAN'S KILLER ROADS FROM CRASH TO VERDICT, 149,
161-62, 176-78 (2d ed. 1999). The history of prior collisions on roads was used to support arguments
that roads were "hazardous" and in need of "repair."
272.23 U.S.C. § 409 (1987).
273. Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 31 P.3d 628 (2001).
274. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
275. The payout data is derived from the same source as indicated in supra note 207 and OFM
records of claim payments.
276. The SIR is an amount which must be paid on a claim before any insurance
reimbursement.
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The payouts and insurance premiums do not completely represent
the state's exposure. In the past three years, two verdicts with a total
value of approximately $25 million have been reversed and dismissed.
There are currently two verdicts on appeal with a value of approximately
$45 million.27 7
The trends from 1974-1998 remained after 1998. For claim years
1999 through 2004, there were twenty-seven verdicts or settlements over
$1 million, fifteen of those were over $2 million. Moreover, there are
still large claims pending for those claim years. Of the payouts over $1
million, twenty-one of them were for correctional, social welfare, or
regulatory liabilities. Five of the remaining six large claim payouts were
for highway claims based at least partly on negligent design or failure to
improve theories. The state's payouts are dominated by claims based on
liability for governmental functions. As one might expect, legal defense
costs increased in conjunction with the increasing complexity of lawsuits
against the state. The Torts Division currently has a total staff of 135,
including over fifty lawyers. The biennial budget is approximately $38
million. Thus, the total cost of state tort liability has increased to an
approximate range of $110 million to $150 million per biennium.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE WAIVER AFTER FORTY-FIVE YEARS
A. Application of the Waiver Has Not Been Consistent with
Legislative Intent at the Time the Waiver was Enacted
The legal context at the time of the waiver indicates that the
Legislature did not intend to create liability for governmental functions.
At that time, the perception was that agencies should be liable for routine
torts, not that agencies should be liable for uniquely governmental
functions. Indeed, this interpretation was given to the New York waiver,
which was similar to the Washington waiver. This was also the
interpretation given to the Washington waiver. Evangelical interpreted
the requirement that liability be analogous to private liability to mean
that the waiver was not intended to create governmental liability.7 ' At
that time, Washington counties and quasi-municipal governments had
lacked sovereign immunity for almost 100 years. Washington cases had
not created liability for governmental functions, despite the lack of
sovereign immunity.
In the mid-1970s, Washington cases began interpreting the waiver
as allowing liability for governmental functions. These cases did not
277. See discussion note 207, infra. The value includes post-judgment interest.
278. Evangelical Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 254, 407 P.2d 440, 444 (1965).
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analyze the context of the waiver or the effect of the private liability
condition in the waiver, but relied on cases from other jurisdictions to
reduce discretionary immunity.27 9 The new interpretation of the waiver
dramatically changed the nature and cost of government liability in
Washington.
B. Legal Consequences of the Waiver
The primary legal consequence of the waiver has been broad
liability for the regulatory, police, correctional, social welfare, and
highway design functions of government. Within the development of this
liability, there have been several subordinate trends.
After the waiver, government liability remained unchanged for
almost a dozen years. This period was followed by twenty-five years of
liability expansion. Only a few cases, primarily those dealing with
regulatory functions, limited governmental liability. In the last six years,
decisions have reduced some governmental liability, particularly
correctional and social welfare liability. Curiously, this trend has been
different for state and local governments. Almost all recent state cases
narrow liability, whereas local government cases expand liability on
correctional, law enforcement, highway, and even social welfare
claims.
280
One difference among the three eras has been the degree to which
cases rely on statutes to determine government duties. Following the
waiver, cases such as Evangelical, Morgan, and Loger looked closely at
governing statutes and the nature of programs to determine the existence
and scope of duty. During the next twenty-five years, cases such as
Stewart, Petersen, and Taggart paid less attention to statutes governing
agencies. These cases created duties based on general tort principles or
the Restatement of the Law of Torts. In the most recent period, cases
returned to a close analysis of statutes and agency programs to determine
the existence of duty and boundaries for liability. This is particularly
279. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975), and King v. City of Seattle, 84
Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974), were the two cases that changed previous concepts of
governmental liability. See supra Part III.B.a-b. The last case to mention the private liability
condition was Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 595 P.2d 534 (1979), dealing with the issue of
military discipline. After the 1970s, Washington courts, unlike New York courts, did not use the
private liability condition as a limitation on liability for governmental functions, although it was
mentioned in Cena v. State, 121 Wash. App. 352, 89 P.3d 432 (2004).
280. See, e.g., Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash. 2d 237, 44 P.3d 845 (2002); Bishop v.
Miche, 137 Wash. 2d 518, 973 P.2d 465 (1999); Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265, 979
P.2d 40 (1999); Osborn v. Mason County, 122 Wash. App. 823, 95 P.3d 1257 (2004); Caulfield v.
Kitsap County, 108 Wash. App. 242, 29 P.3d 738 (2001); Rodriguez v. Perez, 99 Wash. App. 439,
994 P.2d 874 (2000).
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evident in Couch, in the newer social welfare cases such as Pettis, M W.,
and Terrell C., and in regulatory cases such as Murphy and Halleran.
Over the forty-five years since the waiver, courts have changed
their approach to separation of powers. Evangelical, consistent with New
York and federal law, held that tort liability should not interfere with
policies in the legislative and executive branches of government. By the
mid-1970s, courts protected explicit policy-making by the highest
officials, but allowed tort liability for the implementation of policies. By
the 1990s, the Washington Supreme Court stated that liability should
affect government policy-making in the areas of child welfare and the
release and oversight of offenders in cases such as Babcock, Savage, and
Bishop.2 81 Washington cases adopted an approach to separation of
powers which did not recognize the traditional deference given to
policies of other branches of government.
C. Financial Consequences of the Waiver
The waiver initially had little effect on local government because
county, city, and quasi-municipal governments already had liability for
all activities except those of city departments with governmental
functions. The waiver also had little effect on state government because
claims for traditional tort liabilities were few in number and modest in
cost. After decisions created liability for governmental functions, the
effect of the waiver has been to produce very high tort costs for a relative
handful of claims every year. For instance, DSHS resolved 259 FY 2004
claims for $6.6 million through April 2005, but $6,335,000 of that
amount was paid on only six claims.282 The major cost of state tort
liability lies in lawsuits in which the government has joint and several
liability with an offender, an underinsured motorist, or another third-
party wrongdoer.
As a consequence of expanded tort liability, state and local
governments lost the ability to insure most activity, and any available
insurance was costly. Ironically, one of the original justifications for
abolishing sovereign immunity was the availability of low cost
insurance. Even in California, where liabilities are limited by statute, the
281. Savage v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995), citing Babcock v. State, 116
Wash. 2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991), states that a purpose of state liability is "the salutary effect of
providing the state an incentive to ensure that reasonable care is used in fashioning guidelines and
procedures forthe supervision of parolees." Savage was cited for this point in Bishop, 137 Wash. 2d
at 529-30, 973 P.2d at 470-71. This is a reversal in position from Evangelical, which held that tort
liability for polices and procedures for supervising juvenile offenders "would do naught but stifle the
basic governmental process and policy." Evangelical, 67 Wn.2d at 258, 407 P.2d at 446-47.
282. These are claims filed in FY 2004 and these amounts represent claim resolutions through
April 2005. These amounts will increase as additional FY 2004 claims are resolved.
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availability and cost of insurance was a problem for local government by
the mid-1970s. Local government in Washington experienced difficulty
in the same period. These problems were serious by the mid-1980s, when
local governments were part of the coalition supporting the 1986 Tort
Reform Act. Since that time, state government has been largely
uninsured, but the cost of its "excess" policy has risen sharply with
reduced coverage as payouts for governmental liabilities increase in
number and size.
Another consequence of expanded tort liability for governmental
functions is the risk to local jurisdictions by the potential for major
claims. In the past ten years, the state has had verdicts against it for $2.6
million, $3.6 million, $6.4 million, $8 million, $8.4 million, $9 million,
$15 million, $17.8 million, and $22.5 million. All of these verdicts were
for correctional, social welfare, regulatory, and/or civil rights liabilities
rather than traditional tort liability. Although four of these were reversed
and dismissed on appeal and two are pending on appeal, they indicate the
kind of exposures governments face.283 A smaller city or county
government might not have legal defense and insurance or risk pool
resources adequate for the claims and verdicts possible under current
law.
D. Problems Presented by Washington's Open-Ended Waiver
1. Global Problems
When legislative researchers from Kentucky and Colorado studied
immunity waivers, they concluded that the open-ended waiver was the
poorest choice. 284 They foresaw that case-by-case development of law
would cause uncertainty due to the nature of government activity, and
noted the difficulty of comparing it to private activity. They foresaw that
this uncertainty would cause problems with insurability and high defense
costs, and that risk management would be a problem because of high
inherent risk and inability of government to withdraw from, limit, or
manage activities as a private entity would. Additionally, they predicted
283. The four verdicts reversed on appeal are Murphy v. State, 115 Wash. App. 297, 62 P.3d
533 (2003); Couch v. Dep't of Corrs., 113 Wash. App. 556, 54 P.3d 197 (2002), review denied, 149
Wash. 2d 1012, 69 P.3d 874 (2003); Wilson v. State, 84 Wash. App. 332, 929 P.2d 448 (1996),
review denied, 131 Wash. 2d 1022, 937 P.2d 1103 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 949 (1997); and
Liberty Bank of Seattle, Inc. v. Henderson, 75 Wash. App. 546, 878 P.2d 1259 (1994), review
denied, 126 Wash. 2d 1002, 891 P.2d 37 (1995). Joyce v. State, 116 Wash. App. 569, 75 P.3d 548
(2003), review granted, 150 Wash. 2d 1032, 84 P.3d 1229 (2004), is pending in the supreme court
along with an appeal of an $8 million verdict in a case involving alleged liability for a crime
committed by foster children. One large verdict was settled on appeal for a smaller amount.
284. See discussion supra Part l.C.
Seattle University Law Review
that some public entities would be unprotected due to problems with
insurability and scope of risk. As a result, the researchers recommended
that the legislature control public liability.
The researchers accurately predicted problems that occurred under
Washington's waiver. Problems arose from the broad liability created for
high-exposure governmental functions in a particular case, followed by
years, even decades, of litigation and high claim costs as subsequent
cases worked out the boundaries of the new liability. For instance, only
now, twenty-two years after Petersen, are cases defining the boundaries
of liability for supervision of offenders. Even with these boundaries,
however, this is an expensive liability that presents a major risk for the
government.
One kind of liability stabilized as a result of case law development.
Regulatory liability became uncertain in the 1970s and 1980s because
decisions created broad liability for building code enforcement and
police activities. By the early 1990s, liability became more predictable
with the adoption of the public duty doctrine and its exceptions. The
doctrine can be adjudicated in summary judgment motions. However, it
took almost twenty years to define the rules, and concurring and
dissenting opinions in cases suggest that the certainty of the public duty
doctrine should be discarded in favor of a more ad hoc approach.
285
In addition to problems with uncertainty, insurability, and cost, the
nature of the open-ended waiver creates heavy liability for unavoidably
injury-prone government programs such as mental health, corrections,
and social welfare. Case-by-case adjudication responds to facts in a
particular case, and a court does not consider the effect of its decision
upon a government program to be a reason to deny recovery on the
merits of a specific case. Individual cases also do not provide evidence
that enables a court to determine if liability that seems appropriate on
limited facts would be problematic if applied to thousands of similar
situations. A decision to award compensation to a sympathetic plaintiff
in one case becomes precedent determining liability across a wide
spectrum of government activity, as Petersen v. State did.
Government liability differs from private liability not only because
a single case is likely to have broad effect, but also because government
has limited ability to respond to increased liability. Some Washington
decisions express the view that broad liability will force program
285. In Babcock, the concurring opinion suggested discarding the public duty doctrine in favor
of using "traditional tort law analysis," but then resolved the issue of the duty of firefighters by
analyzing whether there should be liability under the facts of the particular case. Babcock, 144
Wash. 2d at 800-01, 30 P.3d at 1275.
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286improvements by penalizing government conduct and policies.
However, analogies to the accident reduction and risk spreading models
of private tort liability are not necessarily sound in the government
context. Liability for a private service forces the provider to improve the
service or be displaced by another provider. If the liability is inherent in
the service, then the liability cost simply becomes part of the cost of all
providers, thus spreading risk. Government liability does not achieve this
result. There is only one provider, and staff, resources, and level of
service are largely fixed by budgets and statutes. Liability costs come out
of agency budgets and reduce program services. There is no other
provider who will displace the program, and there is no spreading of
costs. Thus, liability for high-risk programs reduces funding for
programs whose ability to manage risk is severely constrained because
the risk is inherent in the governmental function.
2. Specific Problems
Several problems flow from the narrow interpretation of
discretionary immunity in King v. City of Seattle and subsequent cases.
By limiting immunity to high level policy decisions, King created
potential liability for judgment exercised by officials on licenses,
permits, investigations, law enforcement, firefighting, and similar
matters. These are not decisions based on rule or formula. These
decisions involve complex situations and the application of rules and
policies, such as whether to amend a permit, whether to withdraw from a
dangerous fire, or whether to recommend removal of a child. These
decisions are commonly protected from liability under federal law and in
other jurisdictions, including New York and California.287 Three
Washington cases recognized qualified immunities for public officials,2 88
but these immunities were not applied in later cases.28 9
286. See discussion supra note 279.
287. The scope of discretionary immunity for decisions by public officials in California after
Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968), is summarized supra note 95 and, for federal officials, is
summarized supra note 57. In New York, discretionary immunity is commonly applied to decisions
of public officials on specific matters requiring the exercise of judgment, such as whether to release
a juvenile offender or even whether to post non-mandatory highway warning signs. Anton v. State of
New York, 757 N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Niles v. County of Chautauqua, 755 N.Y.S.2d
157 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), leave to appeal dismissed, 793 N.E.2d 413 (N.Y. 2004).
288. Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195, 822 P.2d 243 (1992); Babcock v. State, 116 Wash. 2d
596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991); Guffey v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 144, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984).
289. No cases subsequent to Babcock and Taggart have applied qualified immunity to protect
state or local government from liability. Lesley v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 83 Wash. App. 263,
921 P.2d 1066 (1996), and Waller v. State, 64 Wash. App. 318, 824 P.2d 1225 (1992), declined to
apply qualified immunity to social worker decisions. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 2d 265,
979 P.2d 400 (1999), Bishop v. Miche, 137 Wash. 2d 518, 973 P.2d 465 (1999), and Savage v. State,
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The lack of immunity for governmental decisions is most likely the
reason for the continuing strength of the public duty doctrine in
Washington. Regulators, police, and fire officials (but not correctional
officers or social workers) are largely protected from liability by the
doctrine in situations in which they decline to act or fail to enforce a law.
However, there is an inconsistency when these same officials take
affirmative action. Washington cases rarely apply the public duty
doctrine to protect affirmative acts by regulators and police.
The lack of discretionary immunity for all but high level policy
decisions effectively creates liability for those decisions if the decisions
involve risk-prone governmental functions. For instance, if budget
shortfalls cause the Legislature to direct the DOC to move 1,000
offenders into work release, the state would not be liable for the
offenders' post-release crimes on the theory that the Legislature made a
careless decision. However, the immunity for the Legislature would have
little value because the state could be liable for the same crimes on the
theory that the DOC's selection and supervision of each work release is
an operational activity which presents a question of fact for the jury on
state liability. The state's chance of prevailing before a jury on such
claims would be remote. The fact that crimes occurred would all but
prove that the DOC selected the wrong offenders for work release and
supervised them carelessly. Therefore, the state could have liability for
the inevitable consequence of the legislative decision.
The public duty doctrine is the one area of governmental liability
that has developed rules protecting governmental functions, though
problems nevertheless exist. The doctrine is reliably applied to reject
claims for property, economic, and investment losses, but courts virtually
always find an exception if the claim is for personal injury.2 9 °
Additionally, there are many licensing, inspection, and complaint
programs in areas which have the potential for large claims if the
government is liable for injuries caused by the licensed entities or alleged
failures to investigate complaints about licensees. Daycares, nursing
homes, group homes for juveniles and disabled, adult family homes,
medical service providers, and foster parents are among the risk prone
entities licensed by the state. The failure to apply the public duty doctrine
127 Wash. 2d 434, 899 P.2d 1270 (1995), stated that qualified immunity might protect individual
employees from liability, but not government.
290. For instance, early public duty cases finding liability involved fatal accidents (Halvorson
v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530
P.2d 234 (1975)), and cases finding no liability involved economic loss (Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash.
2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979); Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (1976)). This
pattern continues in later cases.
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to regulated social welfare activities would produce major new
governmental liabilities.
A second problem with the application of the public duty doctrine
is the decision 291 that child abuse investigations are not protected by the
doctrine. Other applications of the legislative intent exception created
somewhat manageable liabilities because specific enforcement actions in
defined circumstances could avoid liability.292 In contrast, liability for
child abuse investigation is broad and open-ended because it depends on
judgments made by social workers, typically based on limited or
conflicting evidence, while balancing child safety and family integrity. A
social worker making a decision on a child abuse investigation does not
have a clear action that he or she can take to avoid liability.
The liability for child abuse investigations is also complicated by
the liability to parents for the temporary removal of a child, which exists
even if a court approves child removals at shelter care hearings.2 93
Indeed, Justice Talmadge, in his dissent to Tyner v. Dep't of Soc. &
294Health Servs., argued strongly that the duty to protect a child and the
duties to the parents suspected of abuse are irreconcilable.
Liability for crimes by released offenders is an especially
problematic liability. The conceptual basis for the liability is that post-
release and probation systems give the government control over
offenders, rendering the government liable for their crimes. Other than
Washington, every jurisdiction that has considered this liability appears
to have judicially or legislatively rejected it, except in narrow
circumstances.2 95 This liability is costly because governments are
codefendants in cases with offenders who have committed heinous
crimes or caused tragic accidents, leading to punitive verdicts. The
increasing potential for catastrophic liability claims in this area is a threat
to our correctional and court systems.
291. Yonker v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wash. App. 71, 930 P.2d 958 (1997).
292. In Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978), the city could mitigate the
risk of tort liability by enforcing a hotel safety code in a limited number of old hotels. Donaldson v.
City of Seattle, 65 Wash. App. 661, 831 P.2d 1098 (1992), review dismissed, 120 Wash. 2d 1031,
847 P.2d 481 (1993), created only a mandatory duty to arrest under defined and limited
circumstances involving domestic violence.
293. Although police are authorized to take custody of children in an emergency, state social
workers do not have that authority, but must petition the court for an order permitting removal.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.050 (2005).
294. 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000).
295. For instance, New York allows liability for a crime by an offender if police have made a
promise to a specific person to protect that person from the offender. The liability is similar to the
special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d
937 (N.Y. 1987).
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The policy issue for many governmental functions is that liability
relates to decisions that require judgment about the application of law
and rules to disputed facts in risk-prone areas. The difficulty with
governmental liability for highway design is different. Highways are
built and signage is placed in accordance with standards developed by
national experts. Prior to the era of governmental liability, Washington
courts essentially accepted these standards as the basis for the
government's duty in cases making claims for negligent repair and
signage. Current law creates a problem for highway officials because it
creates liability for design and signage, even if highways satisfy well-
accepted national standards.
CONCLUSION
In 1961, the Legislature enacted an open-ended waiver of immunity
that was intended to make state government liability comparable to
private liability. This waiver worked well for several years, providing
compensation to persons injured by routine government operations. The
effect of the waiver changed, however, when courts no longer applied the
private liability condition, which created a unique and unprecedented
liability for government activities.
The open-ended waiver is no longer satisfactory. The case-by-case
development of government liability law has been uncertain,
inconsistent, and costly. The cases have not protected judgment
exercised by public officials or the implementation of legislative and
executive policy decisions. On the contrary, the cases have created
liability for governmental functions with inherent risk factors, such as
misconduct of third parties, which cannot be fully eliminated, even with
the best possible risk management. The broad liability for these functions
has diverted the resources of worthwhile programs to pay legal defense
costs and verdicts that result from the act of governing.
The Legislature should replace Washington's waiver with statutes
that precisely define the extent of liability for state and local government
functions. A statutory liability scheme would serve the public better than
would the open-ended waiver. The history of the waiver in Washington
and in other states provides the Legislature with ample information to
determine "where, in the area of governmental processes, orthodox tort
liability stops and the act of governing begins. 296
The most compelling need is to reiterate the original condition in
the Washington waiver: that government liability be comparable to the
liability of private parties. As in other jurisdictions, there should be no
296. Evangelical Church ofAdna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 253, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
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liability for government functions that have no counterpart in the private
sector. The Legislature should return Washington's waiver to the
interpretation given in Evangelical, and should adopt the rules of law set
forth in New York cases that have interpreted the same waiver language
since 1929.
Consistent with a reiteration of the private liability condition, the
Legislature should adopt a discretionary immunity that protects
judgments made by public officials in areas of governmental decision-
making, such as regulation, law enforcement, and social welfare. The
qualified immunities adopted by Washington courts have not sheltered
decisions in which public officials exercise judgment about the
application of law, rules, and policies to facts. Again, the Legislature
should return discretionary immunity to the interpretation adopted in
Evangelical, which is similar to discretionary immunity under federal
law and law in other states, such as New York.
Adopting a statutory discretionary immunity would reduce the need
to use the public duty doctrine to determine when government actors are
performing governmental functions that are not subject to liability. The
doctrine would remain necessary to determine whether government had a
duty to act in situations in which government failed to act. The
Legislature should adopt the doctrine and its exceptions as means for
determining whether regulatory, police, and social programs create a
duty to act on behalf of individuals. However, the Legislature should
define the legislative intent exception more carefully because the current
interpretation of its criteria misapplies the doctrine by treating only
injured persons, rather than all protected persons, as intended
beneficiaries of social programs.
Under the open-ended waiver, courts have created heavy liability
for high-risk governmental functions. Foremost among these functions
are offender supervision and child protective activities. The risks in these
programs cannot be mitigated by traditional risk management because
government cannot eliminate or reduce the dangerous function, nor can it
directly control the unlawful behavior of the third parties who cause the
injuries. Liability for these functions is fundamentally at odds with the
private liability condition in the waiver. Other states have limited this
liability to narrow circumstances. The Legislature should similarly limit
correctional and social program liability to harms caused by public
employees directly or caused by their disobedience of statutes, court
orders, or specific promises of protection. Funds should be spent on the
programs and not on defense costs and claim payments inflated by
emotion and outrage towards the criminal acts of codefendants in these
cases.
Seattle University Law Review
The open-ended waiver has also caused uncertainty about liability
for the governmental functions of designing highways and funding
capital improvements. New York and other states typically limit liability
for these functions by statute or by application of discretionary
immunity. The Legislature should clarify the law by limiting liability for
governmental highway programs. While liability for ordinary
maintenance and lack of required warnings should remain, there should
be no liability for facilities that substantially comply with standards for
design and signage, and there should not be liability for failure to fund
capital improvements. The design and funding of public highway
systems presents issues and has constraints that are not comparable to
those in private capital projects.
In examining alternatives to the open-ended waiver, the Legislature
should also consider coverage limits that are analogous to private
insurance coverage limits. When Washington waived immunity in 1961,
tort liability was less prevalent and expensive than it is in today's trend
towards deep pocket litigation. A large majority of states that waived
immunity in the modern era imposed financial limits on public liability,
and those that did not often exercised control through special tribunals or
restrictive waivers. Appropriate coverage limits would provide
reasonable compensation for injuries caused by government operations
while protecting government from excessive claims.
The Washington Constitution expressly gives the Legislature
control over lawsuits against the government.297 Forty-five years ago, the
Legislature exercised this authority by enacting an open-ended waiver of
the state's immunity from tort lawsuits. The passage of time and changes
in tort law have made this open-ended waiver outmoded; it is a growing
burden on legitimate government interests. The Legislature should revisit
the waiver and adopt modern statutes that draw a clear boundary between
orthodox tort liability and the act of governing.
297. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26.
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APPENDIX I
OVER VIEW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
WAIVERS AND DA MA GE LIMITS
These are abbreviated descriptions which will permit general
comparisons of different approaches to the waiver of sovereign
immunity. While most states now have overall state and/or local
government tort claims acts, some states have a variety of different
provisions for different government units or situations and this chart
cannot capture all of this detail. Statutory citations are very abbreviated
in order to fit this chart.
State Nature of Waiver Damage Limits
State Local State Local
AL Immune. No immunity. $100,000/
ALA. CONST. $300,00098
art. I, § 14
AK Partial waiver No immunity. $400,000 to $1,000,000 for
with immunity non-economic damages.





AZ Partial waiver with immunities
for governmental functions.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-820
AR Claims Immune $10,000 Insurance
commission. except to ARK. CODE limits.
ARK. CODE extent of § 19.10.201 ARK. CODE
§ 19.10.201 et insurance. etseq. § 21.9.201 et
seq. ARK. CODE seq.
§ 21.9.201 et
seq.
298. The first number is the limit per individual claim and the second is the limit for all claims
in an occurrence or incident.
299. Statutory discretionary immunity is generally interpreted as preserving immunity for all
decisions involving governmental issues such as release of prisoners, licenses and permits, crime,
investigations, etc.
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Nature of Waiver Damage LimitsState Local State Local
CA Statutory scheme of liabilities
and immunities.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810 et seq.
CO Partial waiver with immunities None. $150,000/
for governmental functions. $600,000
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 COLO. REV.
STAT.
§ 24-10-114
CT State claims commissioner; tort
lawsuits only if allowed by
commissioner.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160
DE Immunity except for vehicles, $300,000 or insurance
buildings, and pollution. limits.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4012 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4013
FL Waiver for acts or omissions $100,000/$200,000 or
which would create liability for insurance limits.
private person.3 °0  FLA. STAT. ch. 768.28
FLA. STAT. ch. 768.28
GA Partial waiver with immunities $100,000,000/$3,000,000
for governmental and GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-29
operational functions.30 1
GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-23 et
seq.
HI Partial waiver with immunity
for discretionary functions and
no joint and several liability.
HAW. REV. STAT. §662-1 et
seq., § 663-10.5
ID Partial waiver with $250,000 (non-economic
governmental immunities. damages)
IDAHO CODE § 6-902 IDAHO CODE § 6-1603
300. The limitation of liability to that comparable to a private person is generally interpreted as
excluding liability for governmental functions.
301. Some states preserve immunities not only for governmental functions but for some
operational activities, such as snow and ice removal on roads or medical care of residents of state
institutions.
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State Nature of Waiver Damage LimitsState Local State Local










IN Partial waiver with $300,000/$5,000,000
governmental and operational IND. CODE § 34-13-3-7
immunities.
IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3
IA Partial waiver with
governmental and operational
immunities.
IOWA CODE § 669.1
KS Partial waiver with $500,000
governmental and operational KAN. STAT. ANN.
immunities. § 75-6105
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104








LA Waiver of immunity. $500,000 (non-economic
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5101 damages)
et seq. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:5106
ME Immunity except for specified $400,000
vehicle, property, road, and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
pollution claims. 14, § 8105
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 8104-A
Seattle University Law Review
Nature of Waiver Damage LimitsState Local State Local
MD Partial waiver Partial waiver $200,000 $200,000/
with immunity with immunity MD. CODE $500,000
for willful or for ANN., MD. CODE
grossly discretionary STATE ANN., CTS. &
negligent acts. GOv'T JUD. PROC.
employee acts. MD. CODE § 12-104 § 5-303
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
JUD. PROC. § 5-507
§ 5-522
MA Partial waiver with
governmental immunities.
MASS. GEN. LAWS 258 § 2
MI Immunity for governmental






MN Partial waiver Partial waiver $300,000/$100,000







MS Waiver of immunity. $500,000
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5 MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-46-15
MO Immunity except for vehicles Approx. $300,000/
and dangerous property. $1,200,000
MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.600. MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.6 10
MT Waiver to extent that a private $750,000/$1,000,000
person would be liable. MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-101 § 2-9-108
et seq.
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State Nature of Waiver Damage Limits
State Local State Local
NB Claims Board Partial waiver $1,000,000/
with with $5,000,000
exemptions for governmental NEB. REV.
governmental and STAT. § 81-8,
functions and operational 209 to 235
legislative immunities.
review of large NEB. REV.
claims. STAT. § 81-8,
NEB. REV. 209 to 235
STAT. § 81-8-
209 to 235
NV Waiver of immunity. $50,000
NEV. REV. STAT. 41.031 NEV. REV. STAT. 41.035
NH Claims Board Immune $250,000/ $150,000/
(under except for $2,000,000 $500,000
$50,000); vehicles, N.H. REV. N.H. REV.
partial waiver premises, and STAT. ANN. STAT. ANN.
with road 541-B: 14 507-B:4
discretionary maintenance.
immunity. N.H. REV.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN. 507-B:2
541-B:1 et seg.
NJ Partial waiver with
governmental and some
operational immunities.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to -7
NM Immunity except for vehicle, $100,000-$750,000
property, law enforcement, and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19
certain specified operational
functions.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1
to -29
NY Waiver to the extent a private
person would be liable.
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Nature of Waiver Damage LimitsState Local State Local
NC Claims Board; Immune $500,000 Insurance
waiver of except to N.C. GEN. limits.
immunity to extent of STAT. N.C. GEN.
extent that insurance. § 143.299.2 STAT.
private person N.C. GEN. § 160A-485
would be liable. STAT.
N.C. GEN. § 160A-485
STAT.
§ 143.291
ND Partial waiver Partial waiver $250,000/ $250,000/
with with immunity $1,000,000 $500,000
governmental for certain N.D. CENT. N.D. CENT.
and some governmental CODE CODE
operational functions. § 32- § 32-12.1.03




OH Court of Partial waiver $250,000
Claims; waiver with immunity (non-
to extent of for economic
private party discretionary damages)
liability, acts & gov't OHIO REV.
OHIO REV. functions. CODE ANN.
CODE ANN. OHIO REV. § 27.44.05
§ 2743.02-03 CODE ANN.
§ 27.44.01 et
seq.
OK Partial waiver with liability to $250,000-$200,000/
extent of private parties and $1,000,000
immunity for governmental and OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 154
many operational functions.
OKLA, STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-60
OR Partial waiver with immunity $50,000-$200,000/$500,000
for discretionary acts, tax ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.270
collection, and claims covered
by workers compensation.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.265
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Nature of Waiver Damage Limits
State Local State Local
PA Immunity except for vehicles, $250,000/$1,000,000
roads, medical claims, liquor 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528
sales, and certain other
functions.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522
RI Waiver to extent of private $100,000 except no limit if
liability, function proprietary.
R.I. GEN. LAWS 9-31-1 R.I. GEN. LAWS 9-31-12
SC Waiver to extent of private $300,000-$1,200,000;
liability. $600,000-$1,200,000
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-78-120
SD Waiver to extent of insurance Insurance limits.
coverage. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 21-32-16 21-32-16
TN Immune except for vehicles, Insurance limits.
roads and property. TENN. CODE ANN.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-101 § 29-20-311
to 111
TX Partial waiver with immunity $100,000- $100,000-
for discretionary acts and some 250,000/ $250,000/
governmental functions. $500,000 $300,000-
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE $500,000





UT Partial waiver with $221,400-$553,500/
governmental immunities. $1,107,000
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-301 UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-30d-604
VT Partial waiver with $250,000/$1,000,000
governmental immunities. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 § 5601
VA Partial waiver to the extent of $100,000 or insurance
private liability, limits.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.1 VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-195.3
Seattle University Law Review
Nature of Waiver Damage LimitsState Local State Local
WV Partial waiver with $500,000
governmental and operational W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3
immunities.
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-l to -12
WI Partial waiver with immunity $250,000 $50,000,
for discretionary decisions. WIS. STAT. except for




WY Immunity except for vehicles, $250,000/$500,000/
property, medical and law $1,000,000 (medical claim)
enforcement. WYO. STAT. ANN.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-101 § 1-39-118
to -121
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